13.3 With regard to the State party's contention that the author's communication pertaining to selfdetermination should be declared inadmissible for the reason that "the Committee's jurisdiction, as defined by the Optional Protocol, cannot be invoked by an individual when the alleged violation concerns a collective right", the Committee reaffirmed that the Covenant recognizes and protects in most resolute terms a people's right of selfdetermination and its right to dispose of its natural resources, as an essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights and for the promotion and strengthening of those rights. However, the Committee observed that the author, as an individual, could not claim under the Optional Protocol to be a victim of a violation of the right of self-determination enshrined in article 1 of the Covenant which deals with rights conferred upon peoples as such. 13.4 The Committee noted, however, that the facts as submitted might raise issues under other articles of the Covenant, including article 27. Thus, insofar as the author and other members of the Lubicon Lake Band were affected by the events which the author has described, these issues should be examined on the merits, in order to determine whether they reveal violations of article 27 or other articles of the Covenant. 14. On 22 July 1987, therefore, the Human Rights Committee decided that the communication was admissible insofar as it might raise issues under article 27 or other articles of the Covenant. The State party was requested, under rule 86 of the rules of procedure, to take interim measures of protection to avoid irreparable damage to Chief Ominayak and other members of the Lubicon Lake Band. 15. In its submission under article 4, paragraph 2, dated 7 October 1987, the State party invokes rule 93, paragraph 4, of the Committee's provisional rules of procedure and requests the Committee to review its decision on admissibility, submitting that effective domestic remedies have not been exhausted by the Band. It observes that the Committee's decision appears to be based on the assumption that an interim injunction would be the only effective remedy to address the alleged breach of the Lubicon Lake Band's rights. This assumption, in its opinion, does not withstand close scrutiny. The State party submits that, based on the evidence of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench and the Court of Appeal - the two courts which had had to deal with the Band's request for interim relief - as well as the socio-economic conditions of the Band, its way of life, livelihood and means of subsistence have not been irreparably damaged, nor are they under imminent threat. Accordingly, it is submitted that an interim injunction is not the only effective remedy available to the Band, and that a trial on the merits and the negotiation process proposed by the Federal Government constitute both effective and viable alternatives. The State party reaffirms that it has a right, pursuant to article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol to insist that domestic redress be exhausted before the Committee considers the matter. It claims that the terms "domestic remedies", in accordance with relevant principles of international law, must be understood as applying to all established local procedures of redress. As long as there has not been a final judicial determination of the Band's rights under Canadian law, there is no basis in fact or under international law for concluding that domestic redress is ineffective, nor for declaring the communication admissible under the Optional Protocol. In support of its claims, the State party provided a detailed review of the proceedings before the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench and explained its long-standing policy to seek the resolution of valid, outstanding land claims by Indian Bands through negotiation. 16.1 Commenting on the State party's submission, the author, in a letter dated 12 January 1988, maintains that his and the Lubicon Lake Band's allegations are well-founded. According to Chief Ominayak, the State party bases its request for a review of the decision on admissibility on a mere restatement of the facts and is seeking to have the Committee reverse its decision under the guise of substantiation of its previous submissions, without adducing any new grounds. Recalling the Committee's statement that the communication is admissible insofar as it raises issues under article 27 "or other articles of the Covenant", the author spells out which articles of the Covenant he considers to have been violated. First, he claims that Canada has violated article 2, paragraphs 1 to 3, of the Covenant: paragraph 1, for the reason that the State party has treated the Lubicon Lake Band without taking into consideration elements of a social, economic and property nature inherent in the Band's indigenous community structure; paragraph 2, for the reason that it is said to continue to refuse to solve some issues complained of by the Band for which there remain means of redress; and paragraph 3, for the reason that it is said to have failed to provide the Band with an effective remedy with regard to its rights under the Covenant. 109