(e) furthermore a complaint in a letter of Mr. Croes' lawyer dated 18 May 1984, "that the duration of the investigation itself had taken much too long, unreasonably long". It is unclear whether this complaint refers to the treatment of Mr. Croes himself or the treatment of the [policeman]. In the latter case, this part of the communication would in any case be inadmissible under rule 90, paragraph 1 (b) of the Committee's Rules. 5.3 With regard to the question of admissibility, the State party starts from the assumption that Mr. Croes can be supposed to be invoking articles 6, 14, 26 and article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As for his "right to see others treated equally", the Government cannot find an article in the Covenant protecting such a right. Confronted with the question of whether the Government considers Mr. Croes' communication to be admissible, the Government, to its regret, has to reply in the negative, for the following reasons: Firstly, the communication indicates an abuse of the right to present a communication, for political and propagandist motives. Mr. Croes is the leader of a political party propagating a "status aparte" for the island of Aruba. His principal accusation is that , as a political leader, he was discriminated against by the prosecuting and judicial authorities of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. A complaint based on article 26 of the Covenant could only be made on the basis of an allegation that either the prosecuting authorities or the courts applied the laws to Mr. Croes in a discriminatory way. Though Mr. Croes does indeed accuse the authorities of a "conspiracy" against him, and apparently fears that this spirit of conspiracy has even reached the Judicial Laboratory at Rijswijk in the Netherlands, he fails to bring any concrete evidence in support of his accusations and insinuations. Secondly, Mr. Croes failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies with respect to his complaints under the Covenant. What he did submit to the national authorities were: (a) a protest against the decision not to prosecute [the policeman], (b) a protest against the decision not to prosecute Mr. Croes himself on charges of perjury and holding a car parade without a permit. However, Mr. Croes failed to invoke before the national authorities any of the Covenant's rights mentioned above. Of these rights, at least the articles 6 and 14 are, in accordance with article 93 of the Constitution, "self-executing" in the sense that they can be invoked by individuals before the national courts. In this way the Constitution provides an important "available domestic remedy" in the sense of article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol. Thirdly, Mr. Croes'allegation that the investigating procedures took too long cannot be brought within the scope of article 14, paragraph 3 (b) of the Covenant, because Mr. Croes was not in the position of a person "charged with a criminal offence" within the meaning of that provision. Fourthly, a complaint based on article 6 of the Covenant appears to be made as a result of allegations that: (a) the shots which wounded Mr. Croes were deliberately fired by a policeman in a premeditated attempt to kill him, and (b) that the prosecuting and judicial authorities joined in efforts to cover up this fact and to protect [the policeman] from the normal administration of justice. 29