CCPR/C/118/D/2204/2012 believe that the author’s removal to China would expose her to a real risk of a violation of her right to life. The author’s contentions in this respect are general allegations mentioning the risk of persecution and imprisonment, which could ultimately lead to her death due to torture, without indicating however that she has experienced any direct threat to her life. In these circumstances, the Committee considers that the author has not sufficiently substantiated her claims under article 6 of the Covenant and therefore declares this part of the communication inadmissible pursuant to article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 10.5 Concerning the author’s claims under article 14 of the Covenant that she was unable to appeal the negative decisions of the Refugee Appeals Board to a judicial body, the Committee refers to its jurisprudence that proceedings relating to the expulsion of aliens do not fall within the ambit of a determination of “rights and obligations in a suit at law” within the meaning of article 14 (1) but are governed by article 13 of the Covenant. 8 Furthermore, the latter provision offers to asylum seekers some of the protection afforded under article 14 of the Covenant, but not the right of appeal to judicial courts. 9 On that basis the Committee concludes that the author’s claims under article 14 are inadmissible ratione materiae under article 3 of the Optional Protocol. 10.6 With regard to the author’s claims under articles 2 and 26 of the Covenant that the State party is discriminating against her on the grounds of her national origin and her status as an asylum seeker, the Committee notes that she has failed to provide sufficient substantiation in support of her claims and, consequently, considers this part of the communication inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 10.7 The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the author’s claims with respect to articles 7 and 18 of the Covenant should be declared inadmissible, owing to insufficient substantiation, and its objections with regard to the extraterritorial application of article 18 of the Covenant. The Committee notes that the author has explained that the reasons she feared being returned to China were based on the detention and treatment that she had allegedly suffered as a result of her religious beliefs, and on country information concerning the ill-treatment of Falun Gong practitioners. The Committee finds that for the purposes of admissibility, the author has provided sufficient details regarding her personal risk of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as an alleged Falun Gong practitioner if she were returned to China and therefore finds the author’s claims under article 7 admissible. 10 As for the allegations concerning a violation of article 18, the Committee considers that they cannot be dissociated from the author’s allegations under article 7, which must be determined on the merits. 11 10.8 As to the author’s separate claim that her detention from 24 October 2012 until late November 2012 with a view to her being deported to China constituted inhuman treatment due to her previous detention and torture in China and thus violated her rights under article 7 of the Covenant, the Committee considers that the author has failed to provide any information to substantiate this allegation. Accordingly, the Committee concludes that this part of the communications is insufficiently substantiated, for purposes of admissibility and is therefore inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 10.9 With regard to the author’s claim under article 27 of the Covenant, the Committee notes that the author has failed to provide sufficient information to enable the Committee to 8 9 10 11 10 See, inter alia, communication No. 2291/2013, A and B v. Denmark, Views adopted on 13 July 2016, para. 7.3. See, inter alia, communication No. 2288/2013, Omo-Amenaghawon v. Denmark, Views adopted on 23 July 2015, para. 6.4, and general comment No. 32 (2007) on the right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, paras. 17 and 62. See communication No. 1957/2010, Z.H. v. Australia, Views adopted on 21 March 2013, para. 8.6. See communication No. 2007/2010, X v. Denmark, Views adopted on 26 March 2014, para. 8.4.