PART IV.  POLICING SITUATIONS “COERCIVE INTERROGATIONS”: THE CIA TORTURE REPORT (2014) a In 2014, the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence published in redacted form the summary findings and conclusions of its study on the programme of detention and interrogation operated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) between late 2001 and 2009. According to the summary, the Senate Committee study detailed a “program of indefinite secret detention and the use of brutal interrogation techniques in violation of United States law, treaty obligations and […] values” which was initiated “by CIA personnel, aided by two outside contractors”. Among the summary findings was the conclusion of the Senate Committee that the use of what were termed “enhanced interrogation techniques” was an ineffective means of eliciting intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees. a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, United States. Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Declassified Revisions, 3 December 2014: http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/press/ committee-releases-study-cias-detention-and-interrogation-program A case that is often used to justify applying force in a suspect interview is the “ticking bomb” scenario.289 The scenario typically involves a suspect who allegedly has information about an impending major terrorist attack, and therefore the information must be retrieved as soon as possible in order to prevent the attack. Yet, ill-treatment has long been associated with high risks of obtaining false confessions and unreliable information.290 In any event, even when the suspect is believed to be preparing a major terrorist attack, there is no justification for torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as indeed, such acts are prohibited at all times.291 Apart from the moral and legal argumentation against torture, such practices are also proven to be ineffective as a tool to extract truthful information.292 As the United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment has stated, “irrefutable evidence from the criminal justice system demonstrates that coercive methods of questioning, even when not amounting to torture, produce false confessions”.293 Someone who is subjected to torture is likely to give any information they believe the torturer wants to hear, as long as this may stop the torture.294 This is particularly problematic when it concerns finding information about something unknown as then it is likely to divert precious human resources who will be used to verify the information retrieved. 289  See also: The Association for the Prevention of Torture, “Defusing the Ticking Bomb Scenario: Why we must say No to torture, always”, 2007: http://www.apt.ch/content/files_res/tickingbombscenario.pdf 290  Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 2016, (A/71/298), para. 17. 291  UNODC Counter-Terrorism Legal Training Curriculum Module 4, Human Rights and Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism, p. 74 http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Module_on_Human_Rights/Module_HR_and_CJ_responses_to_terrorism_ebook.pdf 292  See Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, United States. Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Declassified Revisions, 3 December 2014; Rejali, Darius, Torture and Democracy, New Jersey, United States: Princeton University Press. 2007. 293  Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 2016, (A/71/298), para. 19. 294  Rejali, Darius, Torture and Democracy, New Jersey, United States: Princeton University Press. 2007. 131