CAT/C/71/D/908/2019 international protection until his appeal in April 2017. Thus, the State party considers that if the complainant’s interest in Christianity had begun as early as 2016, it would be reasonable to assume that he should have mentioned this already during his asylum investigation in February 2017. 4.11 Furthermore, the Migration Court considered the complainant’s account of the reasons for his alleged conversion and what Christianity meant to him personally to be both general and vague. In an overall assessment, the Court concluded that the complainant had not plausibly demonstrated that he had converted to Christianity out of personal and genuine religious convictions or that there was a threat against him from his family or the rest of Afghan society because of this. Nor had he plausibly demonstrated that the Afghan authorities or anyone else in Afghanistan had become aware that he had attended church in Sweden, and thus that Christian convictions were ascribed to him. 4.12 In regard to the complainant’s allegation of deficiency in the examination of his conversion in the Migration Court, the State party notes that the complainant’s allegations in this respect were not raised in his appeal to the Migration Court of Appeal. Nor did the complainant’s public counsel have any objections to the Migration Court’s handling of the case when the oral hearing was held, or demand that the case be remanded to the Swedish Migration Agency. The Migration Court of Appeal, therefore, did not have the opportunity to take these specific allegations into consideration when determining the question of leave to appeal. In this context, the State party further notes that the complainant appears to be trying to use the Committee as an appeal court in order to have the credibility of his claims reassessed. The State party reiterates that there is no reason to conclude that the national rulings were inadequate or that the outcome of the domestic proceedings was in any way arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. 4.13 The State party also notes that, with regard to applications for a residence permit or a new examination pursuant to chapter 12, sections 18 and 19, of the Aliens Act, the matter can only be examined if the alien concerned submits evidence of new circumstances that can be assumed to constitute a lasting impediment to the enforcement referred to in chapter 12, sections 1, 2 or 3, of the Aliens Act – that is, there is a risk of the death penalty, torture or persecution (chap. 12, sect. 19, para. 1, point 1, of the Aliens Act). Moreover, a new examination requires that the alien was not previously able to cite the new circumstances, or that the alien show a valid excuse for not having done so (chap. 12, sect. 19, para. 1, point 2, of the Aliens Act). In the present case, the Swedish Migration Agency noted that the complainant’s alleged conversion had already been examined during the ordinary asylum proceedings. The information provided in the application for a new examination was therefore considered to be additions to the information he had already provided about his conversion. Furthermore, the Agency noted that the documents submitted by the complainant to substantiate the alleged threat in Afghanistan had limited probative value, since their authenticity could not be verified and they were easy to forge. The Migration Court subsequently made the same assessment as the Agency, and upheld its decision to reject the complainant’s appeal. 4.14 Against this background, the State party reiterates that it shares the assessment made by the domestic authorities that, due to credibility deficiencies in his account, the complainant has failed to plausibly demonstrate that his stated conversion to Christianity is based on genuine personal religious convictions or that, upon return to his country of origin, he intends to practise Christianity and therefore faces a foreseeable, personal and real risk of being subjected to treatment in breach of the Convention. Furthermore, the State party holds that nothing has emerged to indicate that Christian beliefs are ascribed to the complainant which would constitute substantial grounds for believing that he would be subjected to a real risk of treatment contrary to article 3 of the Convention if he were returned to Afghanistan. In summary, the State party holds that the complainant’s account and the facts relied upon by him in the complaint are insufficient to conclude that the alleged risk of ill-treatment upon his return to Afghanistan meets the requirements of being foreseeable, real and personal. Consequently, enforcement of the expulsion order would not, under the present circumstances, constitute a violation of the obligations of Sweden under article 3 of the Convention. 6