E/CN.4/1992/17 page 103 respected". Even when no law suits are initiated against perpetrators of torture, either because their identity cannot be ascertained or because the prosecuting authorities remain passive, the judiciary can make significant contributions towards reinforcing the prohibition of torture by refusing to admit evidence which, in its opinion, might have been obtained through torture and by ordering the release of anyone who has been arrested and detained in violation of national and international standards. If the judiciary takes such a position the use of torture becomes less worthwhile, and thereby less attractive. 281. There are well-known examples of members of the judiciary who took their independence seriously and acted along the lines mentioned above, and as a result were disciplined or removed from office. It should be realized that this could only happen because of the passivity of their colleagues. If the judiciary as a whole would recognize that the principle of independence requires the judiciary to ensure that the rights of the parties are respected, such regrettable incidents simply could not happen. In too many cases the judiciary, by hiding behind a false claim to impartiality and neutrality, has actually shielded the most brazen violations of human rights. 282. No member of the judiciary can be in doubt any longer as to the rights which a person in detention has under international law, and which consequently have to be ensured to him. The international community has formulated these standards in a number of highly important instruments, ranging from the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners approved by the Economic and Social Council in 1957 and 1977, to the Body of Principles for the Protection of all Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, approved by the General Assembly in 1988. The duties of people charged with control over persons who have been deprived of their liberty are laid down in the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the General Assembly in 1979, and in the Principles of Medical Ethics Relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, particularly Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the General Assembly in 1982. In all these documents the use of torture is explicitly forbidden. In this context it is noteworthy that, in an explanatory note to Principle 6 of the Body of Principles, it is stated that "the term 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment1 should be interpreted so as to extend the widest possible protection against abuses, whether physical or mental". 283. In most of the above-mentioned documents emphasis is laid on the necessity of judicial control and supervision. In Principle 9 of the Body of Principles it is explicitly stated that the authorities which arrest a person, keep him under detention or investigate the case shall exercise only the powers granted to them under the law and the exercise of these powers shall be subject to recourse to a judicial or other authority. This illustrates the highly significant role the judiciary has to play with regard to the protection of a detained person's basic rights. In this context it may be pointed out that when the General Assembly approved the Body of Principles in its resolution 48/173 of 9 December 1988, it urged that every effort be made so that the Body of Principles should become generally known and respected. This