Advance unedited version CAT/C/63/DR/698/2015 has failed to sufficiently substantiate for the purpose of admissibility his claim that he will be at a foreseeable, personal, present and real risk of torture. The Committee finds that, in the present case, the second complainant’s claim under article 3 is inadmissible pursuant to article 22 (2) of the Convention. 8.5 The Committee considers, however, that the arguments put forward by the first complainant raise substantive and procedural issues under article 3 of the Convention, and that those arguments should be dealt with on the merits. Accordingly, as the Committee finds no further obstacles to admissibility, it declares the communication as regards the first complainant admissible under article 3 of the Convention. Consideration of the merits 9.1 In accordance with article 22, paragraph 4, of the Convention, the Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all information made available to it by the parties concerned. 9.2 The issue before the Committee is whether the removal of the first complainant to the Russian Federation would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he/she would be in danger of being subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 9.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture or ill treatment upon return to the Russian Federation. In assessing this risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. 31 9.4 The Committee recalls its General Comment No. 4 on the implementation of article 3 in the context of article 22, according to which the non-refoulement obligation exists whenever there are “substantial grounds” for believing that the person concerned would be in danger of being subjected to torture in a State to which he or she is facing deportation, either as an individual or a member of a group which may be at risk of being tortured in the State of destination; and that the Committee’s practice has been to determine that “substantial grounds” exist whenever the risk is “foreseeable, personal, present and real”. 32 The Committee further recalls that the burden of proof is upon the author of the communication who has to present an arguable case –i.e. to submit circumstantiated arguments showing that the danger of being subjected to torture is foreseeable, present, personal and real. However, when the complainant is in a situation where he/she cannot elaborate on his/her case (…) the burden of proof is reversed and it is up to the State party concerned to investigate the allegations and verify the information on which the communication is based. 33 The Committee gives considerable weight to findings of fact made by the organs of the State party concerned; however, it is not bound by such findings and will make a free assessment of the information available to it in accordance with article 22, paragraph 4 of the Convention, taking into account all the circumstances relevant to each case.34 9.5 In the present case, the Committee notes the complainant’s claim that being a victim of repeated rape, she faced particular difficulties as a result of trauma, stigma and shame, in recounting the sexual abuse she had suffered and that the minor inaccuracies in her account are not material and do not raise doubts about the general veracity of her claims.35 Further, the Committee notes her objection to the State party’ argument according to which she was not credible because she did not oppose the rapes physically and neither did denounce the sexual violence to the authorities nor did consult with a doctor. The Committee notes the first complainant’s assertion that she wanted to undergo a psychological assessment as part of the 31 32 33 34 35 General Comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, para. 43. Ibid, para.11. Ibid, para. 38. Ibid, para. 50. See Alan v. Switzerland and V.L. v. Switzerland. 13