CAT/C/63/DR/698/2015 Advance unedited version reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to his country. There must therefore be additional grounds for the risk of torture to be "foreseeable, real and personal" within the meaning of Article 3 (1) of the Convention.18 The Committee has confirmed its practice after noting that the human rights situation in the Russian Federation remains of concern in a number of areas, in particular in the Northern Caucasus.19 In its General Comment No.1, para. 6, the Committee unequivocally stated that the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. 4.8 In their submission, the complainants claim that because of their connection to the second husband of the first complainant, they would have a political profile exposing them to the concrete, real and personal risk of being tortured in the event of removal. However, they have not substantiated their allegations. The situation in their country cannot on its own constitute a sufficient ground for concluding that the complainants would be in danger of being tortured in the event of removal. The complainants have not demonstrated that they would run a foreseeable, personal and real risk of being subjected to torture upon return to the Russian Federation. 4.9 With regard to the allegations of torture in the past, the State party asserts that torture or ill-treatment a complainant suffered in the past is one of the elements to be taken into account in assessing the complainant's risk of being subjected to torture or ill-treatment in case of return to her/his country. In the present case, before the Committee, the first author argues that in June 2012, four years after the arrest of her second husband, a certain Yusup, an "army official", would have recognized her at her place of work and would have asked her questions about her second husband's friends and their activities. Then he would have kidnapped her, threatened her and raped her on several occasions. The first complainant made the same allegations in the domestic process and they were examined carefully by the national authorities. In particular, the FOM noted that the first complainant did not, according to her own account, consult a doctor after being raped. 4.10 The medical certificate of 27 July 2015 presented to the Committee is the only document to support the allegations of rape. However, its contents do not allow conclusions to be drawn as to the acts that the first complainant claims to have suffered. The present case is thus different from the V.L. v. Switzerland, referred to by the complainants, given the absence of evidence.20 In addition, the national authorities considered that the allegations of the first complainant concerning the alleged ill-treatment suffered were not credible. 4.11 Another factor that must be taken into account in assessing a complainant's risk of being subjected to torture upon return to her/his country of origin is whether she/he has engaged to political activities in or outside of the State of origin. In the present case, the complainants do not claim to have engaged in any political activities in their country of origin or in Switzerland. 4.12 Furthermore, the State party proceeds to explain the factual inconsistencies in the complainants' claims and challenges the credibility of the latter. It refers in full to the reasons given in the decisions of the national asylum authorities as to why the complainants' allegations are not credible and therefore their statements cannot lead to the conclusion that there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be exposed to torture in case of return to their country of origin. The State party highlights several points in this regard. 4.13 In the first asylum procedure, the first complainant claimed to have entered into a religious marriage with her second husband in 2007. The latter was reportedly arrested by masked soldiers in August 2008 as a suspected Chechen fighter. Yusup, one of the soldiers involved in the arrest, reportedly recognized her about four years later at the restaurant where she worked as a waitress. He asked her questions about the husband's activities, threatened her, harassed her, and then repeatedly raped her. 18 19 20 6 See KN v. Switzerland, para 10.5; JUA v. Switzerland (CAT/C/21/D/100/1997), paras. 6.3 and 6.5; TM vs. Republic of Korea (CAT/C/53/D/519/2012), para. 9.7. See S.K. et al v. Sweden (CAT/C/54/D/550/2013), para. 7.6. See S.K. and others v. Sweden, para. 7.8.