The European Regional System 2 torture,264 effectively replacing the distinction based on the purpose of the act by a subjective assessment of the severity of pain and suffering occasioned by the act.265 Under such a distinction, degrading treatment which reaches a certain severity can be re-classified as inhuman treatment, which in turn, if sufficiently serious, can be re-classified as torture.266 The ‘threshold of severity’ approach was reiterated and followed in a number of subsequent decisions of the Court and Commission.267 For example, in Aydin v Turkey,268 the Court restated the defining characteristics of torture established in Ireland v UK, and used these to hold that rape could amount to torture. The case involved a young woman who was held by Turkish police on suspicion of involvement with the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan (the PKK). While in detention, she was blindfolded, stripped, beaten, sprayed with cold water from high pressure jets, and raped. The Court held that “The rape of a detainee by an official of the State must be considered to be an especially grave and abhorrent form of ill-treatment given the ease with which the offender can exploit the vulnerability and weakened resistance of the victim. Furthermore, rape leaves deep psychological scars on the victim which do not respond to the passage of time as quickly as other forms of physical and mental violence... against this background the Court is satisfied that the accumulation of acts of physical and mental violence… especially the cruel act of rape to which she was subjected amounted to torture in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.”269 Furthermore, the Court held that it would have “reached this conclusion on either of the grounds taken separately,” i.e. the allegation of torture due to the rape and the allegation of torture due to the other forms of physical and mental violence inflicted. Accordingly, an act of rape can in and of itself constitute torture. Yet a distinction between the three acts cannot be drawn simply by a crude measure of the level of pain or suffering caused. The assessment is relative and See The Greek Case (1969), op. cit., which considered that the combined application of certain techniques amounted to torture. 265 See dissenting opinion of Judge Zekia, who did not share the view that “extreme intensity of physical or mental suffering is a requisite for a case of ill-treatment to amount to torture” because “the nature of torture admits gradation in its intensity, in its severity and in the methods adopted.” Also, he did not consider that the Court had jurisdiction to overturn the Commission’s earlier decision that the treatment amounted to torture, stating that; “this was a finding of fact for the competent authority dealing with the case in the first instance.” Ibid. § B. 266 Morgan and Evans, Preventing Torture, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 82. 267 See for example, Aksoy v Turkey, no. 21987/93, Rep. 1996-VI, judgement of 18 December 1996; Aydin v Turkey (1997), op. cit.; Selmouni v France, no. 25803/94, ECHR 1999-V, judgement of 28 July 1999. 268 Aydin v Turkey (1997), op. cit. 269 Ibid. §83–86 264 58