The reasoning in Ireland v UK, seems clear and unambiguous; if an act reaches the thresholds set for torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, there can be no justification for it. Furthermore, the conduct of the victim cannot be raised as a defence. For example, in Tomasi v France, the Government advanced as justification for Mr. Tomasi’s treatment his suspected involvement in a terrorist attack. The Court rejected this defence, stating that “[t]he requirements of the investigation and the undeniable difficulties inherent in the fight against crime, particularly with regard to terrorism, cannot result in limits being placed on the protection to be afforded in respect of the physical integrity of individuals.”347 2 The European Regional System threatening the life of the nation.”342 As discussed above, The Greek Case defined inhuman treatment as “at least such treatment as deliberately causes severe suffering, mental or physical, which, in the particular situation is unjustifiable.”343 Despite the non-derogable nature of the prohibition, the Commission, by using the phrase “which in the particular situation is unjustifiable,” appeared to leave the door open to arguments that there may be circumstances in which illtreatment could be justified. This controversial point was revisited in Ireland v UK.344 In this instance, the Commission considered whether the prohibition was absolute, or whether “there may be special circumstances… in which treatment contrary to Article 3 may be justified or excused.”345 In its decision, the Commission closed the loophole opened in The Greek Case, holding that the prohibition was “an absolute one and that there can never be under the Convention or under international law, a justification for acts in breach of the provision prohibiting torture or other ill-treatment.”346 Furthermore, the conduct of the victim at the time of detention is not necessarily a defence to inhuman or degrading treatment. In Rivas v France,348 the applicant, a minor, was kicked in the testicles by a police officer, and required Article 15(1) provides that “In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.” However, Article 15(2) explicitly states that no derogation from Article 3 is possible, even in such an emergency. 343 The Greek Case (1969), op. cit., p. 504. 344 Ireland v UK (1978), op. cit. 345 Ireland v UK (1978), op. cit., §750. This issue was not revisited by the Court in its consideration. 346 Ibid. §752. 347 Tomasi v France, no. 12850/87, ECHR (Series A) No. 241-A, judgement of 27 August 1992, §115. 348 Rivas v France, no. 59584/00, judgement of 1 April 2004. 342 73