ble for acts of torture by private individuals if they fail to respond adequately to them, or fail to take general and specific measures to prevent them. UN TREATY BODIES 1 From the Committee’s jurisprudence, it seems that it is only in the absence of any de jure government control that the Committee will recognise persons holding de facto power as public officials. Where de facto control of a region is held by a faction that does not enjoy government support, acts by members of the faction will not fall within the definition of torture in Article 1 of the Convention.45 Thus, in G.R.B. v Sweden46 a risk of ill-treatment at the hands of Sendeero Luminoso, a non-State entity controlling significant portions of Peru, could not qualify as torture within the meaning of Article 1. However, in Elmi v Australia,47 the Committee considered that, in the exceptional circumstance where State authority was wholly lacking (Somalia had no central government at the time), acts by groups exercising quasi-governmental authority could fall within the definition of Article 1. While this led some authors to believe that the Committee would now apply a wider definition of ‘public official’ in a broader range of circumstances, any such hopes were dashed three years later in H.M.H.I. v Australia.48 In the intervening period, a Transitional National Government had been formed in Somalia, and while doubts remained as to the reach of its territorial authority and its permanence, the Committee considered that acts by entities other than those acting under the authority of, or tolerated by, the new government did not fall within the definition of torture under Article 1.49 The question of whether the failure of a State Party to respond adequately to private torturers amounts to “acquiescence” under UNCAT was considered in Dzemajl and Others v Yugoslavia.50 In this case, the police, though present at the scene, failed to intervene to prevent the destruction of a Roma settlement. The Committee considered that this lack of action constituted acquiescence It is important to recall that article 1 of the Convention also specifies that its definition “is without prejudice to any international instrument or national legislation which does or may contain provisions of wider application.” Thus, the fact that acts are perpetrated by non-officials (de jure or de facto) does not mean they could not qualify as acts of “torture” under other treaties or laws. 46 G.R.B. v Sweden, CAT Communication No. 83/1997, 15 May 1998, §6.5. See also, for example, M.P.S. v Australia, CAT Communication No. 138/1999, 30 April 2002, §7.4; S.V. and Others v Canada, CAT Communication No. 49/1996, 15 May 2001, §9.5. 47 Elmi v Australia, CAT Communication No.120/1998, 14 May 1999, § 6.5. 48 H.M.H.I. v Australia, CAT Communication No 177/2001, 1 May 2002. 49 Ibid. §6.4. The issue was also raised by the complainant, but not specifically addressed by the CAT, in Y.H.A. v Australia, CAT Communication No.162/2000, 23 November 2001. 50 Dzemajl and Others v Yugoslavia (2002), op. cit. 45 14