CCPR/C/122/D/2181/2012 6.2 The Committee observes that by adhering to the Optional Protocol, a State party to the Covenant recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals claiming to be victims of violations of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant (preamble and article 1 of the Optional Protocol). Implicit in a State’s adherence to the Optional Protocol is an undertaking to cooperate with the Committee in good faith so as to permit and enable it to consider such communications and, after examination thereof, to forward its Views to the State party and the individual (art. 5 (1) and (4)). It is incompatible with these obligations for a State party to take any action that would prevent or frustrate the Committee in its consideration and examination of the communication and in the expression of its Views. 5 It is up to the Committee to determine whether a communication should be registered. By failing to accept the competence of the Committee to determine whether a communication should be registered and by declaring beforehand that it will not accept the Committee’s determination on the admissibility or the merits of the communication, the State party has violated its obligations under article 1 of the Optional Protocol.6 Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility 7.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 93 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol. 7.2 The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 7.3 The Committee takes note of the State party��s assertion that the author has failed to request that the Chairperson of Minsk City Court, the Chairperson of the Supreme Court or the Prosecutor General’s Office initiate a supervisory review of the decisions of the domestic courts. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence according to which a petition to a Prosecutor’s Office requesting a review of court decisions that have taken effect does not constitute a remedy that has to be exhausted for the purposes of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol. 7 It also considers that filing requests for supervisory review to the chairperson of a court directed against court decisions that have entered into force and depend on the discretionary power of a judge constitutes an extraordinary remedy, and that the State party must show that there is a reasonable prospect that such requests would provide an effective remedy in the circumstances of the case. 8 Given that the State party has not done so, the Committee considers that it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol from examining the present communication. 7.4 The Committee notes the author’s claim that the State party violated its obligations under article 2 (3) (a) of the Covenant, since it failed to investigate the alleged violation of his rights under article 7 of the Covenant. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence that article 2 (3) can be invoked by individuals only in conjunction with other substantive articles of the Covenant, and therefore considers that the author’s claims under article 2 (3) are inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol. The Committee further refers to paragraph 14 of its general comment No. 20 (1992) on the prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, in which it is stated that article 7 of the Covenant should be read in conjunction with article 2 (3) of the Covenant. The 5 6 7 8 4 See Levinov v. Belarus (CCPR/C/105/D/1867/2009, 1936, 1975, 1977–1981, 2010/2010), para. 8.2; and Poplavny v. Belarus (CCPR/C/115/D/2019/2010), para. 6.2. See Korneenko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/105/D/1226/2003), para. 8.2. See Alekseev v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/109/D/1873/2009), para. 8.4; Lozenko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/112/D/1929/2010), para. 6.3; and Sudalenko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/115/D/2016/2010), para. 7.3. See Gelazauskas v. Lithuania (CCPR/C/77/D/836/1998), para. 7.4; Sekerko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/109/D/1851/2008), para. 8.3; and Schumilin v. Belarus (CCPR/C/105/D/1784/2008), para. 8.3.