CCPR/C/123/D/2537/2015 challenging his conviction before the Supreme Court. These were declared inadmissible on 25 May 2016 and 7 March 2018 respectively (paras. 8.1, 8.3 and 8.5). 11.3 The Committee also notes the State party’s argument that an absolute requirement for a “second instance” cannot be inferred from the wording of article 14 (5) of the Covenant, as the wording actually used in the text is a “higher tribunal”; that this wording can be interpreted in the sense that the reference to a “higher tribunal” means that the case must be heard before a court of the highest academic and professional calibre, which is thus able to guarantee a correct evaluation of the matters submitted for its consideration; that States parties enjoy broad discretion to determine procedures and design effective mechanisms for the protection of rights without being required to establish a second hearing in criminal cases involving senior officials enjoying parliamentary privilege; and that the fact that such persons, as high-ranking officials benefiting from parliamentary immunity, are tried before the court of highest instance for criminal matters is in itself a comprehensive guarantee of due process (paras. 4.4, 4.5 and 6.2). 11.4 The Committee recalls that article 14 (5) of the Covenant provides that everyone convicted of a crime has the right to have his or her conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal according to the law. The Committee recalls that the phrase “according to the law” is not intended to mean that the very existence of a right to review should be left to the discretion of the States parties. Although a State party’s legislation may provide in certain circumstances for the trial of an individual, because of his or her position, by a higher court than would normally be the case, this circumstance alone cannot impair the defendant’s right to have his or her conviction and sentence reviewed by a court. 8 In the present case, the State party has given no indication of the existence of any remedy that the author may use to apply to have his conviction and sentence reviewed by another court. 9 Accordingly, the Committee finds that the State party violated the author’s rights under article 14 (5) of the Covenant. 11.5 The Committee takes note of the author’s allegations that the Supreme Court’s judgment of 17 July 2014 constitutes a violation of his rights under article 25 of the Covenant, since he is banned for life from being elected to public office or serving as a public official (para. 7.6). 11.6 The Committee recalls that article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected, and the right to have access to public service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the exercise of these rights by citizens may not be suspended or excluded except on grounds which are established by law and which are objective and reasonable. 10 The Committee also recalls that if conviction for an offence is a basis for suspending the right to vote or to stand for office, such restriction must be proportionate to the offence and the sentence.11 The Committee further recalls that when this conviction is clearly arbitrary or amounts to a manifest error or denial of justice, or the judicial proceedings resulting in the conviction otherwise violate the right to a fair trial, it may render the restriction of the rights under article 25 arbitrary. 12 11.7 The Committee observes that, on 17 July 2014, the Supreme Court found the author guilty of the crimes of embezzlement by appropriation and contracting without meeting 8 9 10 11 12 GE.18-22078 Terrón v. Spain (CCPR/C/82/D/1073/2002), para. 7.4. See also general comment No. 32, paras. 45– 47. The Committee also notes that the effects of the Constitutional Court ruling of 24 April 2015 that declared several articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure pertinent to the matter to be unconstitutional do not apply to the author’s case, since, in a judgment of 28 April 2016, the Supreme Court found that the Constitutional Court provision was applicable only to executory judgments issued after 24 April 2016. Following the amendment of the Constitution through Legislative Act No. 001 of 2018, the author filed an appeal before the Supreme Court, which declared it inadmissible on 7 March 2018 (paras. 8.4 and 8.5). See general comment No. 25 (1996) on the right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right of equal access to public service, paras. 3 and 4. Ibid., para. 14, and Dissanayake v. Sri Lanka (CCPR/C/93/D/1373/2005), para. 8.5. Nasheed v. Maldives (CCPR/C/122/D/2270/2013 and 2851/2016), para. 8.6. 13