that they are high risk individuals who are likely to re-offend. In fact, recent studies suggest the rate of re-offending for terrorist prisoners is lower than that for others 369 convicted of violent offences. Furthermore, over-intervention can cause stigmatization and be detrimental to rehabilitation efforts, since it is not proportionate to the level of risk 370 and need. 368 Deradicalization and disengagement programmes While terminology is not always applied consistently in practice, targeted interventions 371 can generally be divided into deradicalization or disengagement programmes. There is ongoing debate over whether interventions should focus on one or the other or, instead, 372 should comprise elements of both, and the question raises profound human rights questions. Deradicalization programmes typically counter specific interpretations, positions or arguments (based on political, religious or other ideologies) that inform beliefs and attitudes 373 used to justify the use of extremist violence. If such programmes focus on changing ways of thinking, they can, however, be perceived “as an attempt at brainwashing in the 374 interests of the State.” To the extent that interventions include such features, they conflict with the right to hold opinions without interference, and the prohibition of “any form of effort to coerce the 375 holding or not holding of any opinion”, as stated by the UN Human Rights Committee. In the same vein, there is a clear prohibition under international human rights law of coercion to change or maintain a person’s religion, stemming from the absolute nature of 376 the right to have or adopt a religion. As set out in section 2.1, only the right to manifest one’s religion may be subject to restrictions in limited circumstances – but the right to have or adopt a religion or belief is an absolute right that cannot be restricted. Thus, deradicalization programmes raise serious human rights concerns. It would, therefore, be 368 Renard, “Overblown: Exploring the Gap Between the Fear of Terrorist Recidivism and the Evidence”, op. cit., note 52, p. 27. 369 Andrew Silke and John Morrison, “Re-Offending by Released Terrorist Prisoners: Separating Hype from Reality”, ICCT Policy Brief, September 2020, p. 5. 370 OSCE, Non-custodial Rehabilitation and Reintegration in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization That Lead to Terrorism, op. cit., note 364, p. 110. 371 Council of Europe, “Council of Europe Handbook”, op. cit., note 2, paras. 73-74. 372 For a brief overview of the discussion see: OSCE, Non-custodial Rehabilitation and Reintegration in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization That Lead to Terrorism, op. cit., note 364, pp. 30-32. 373 Council of Europe, “Council of Europe Handbook”, op. cit., note 2, para. 73. 374 ICRC, “Radicalization in Detention – the ICRC’s Perspective”, op. cit., note 134, p. 4. 375 UN CCPR, General Comment No. 34, op. cit., note 168, paras. 9-10. 376 ICCPR, op. cit., note 85, Article 18.2; UN CCPR, “General Comment No. 22”, op. cit., note 161, para. 3 and 5; Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Asma Jahangir, “Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance”, A/60/399, 30 September 2005, paras. 50-51. 77