dynamic process whereby an individual comes to accept terrorist violence as a possible, perhaps even legitimate, course of action. This may eventually, but not necessarily, lead 26 this person to advocate, act in support of, or to engage in terrorism”. Violent extremism leads “someone [to] promote, support, facilitate or commit acts of violence to achieve 27 ideological, religious, political goals or social change”. Experience shows that there is no linear path towards terrorism. VERLT is a dynamic, gradual and phased process that may be accelerated, slowed down or, in some cases, 28 reversed. Some individuals may engage on the path of VERLT without attaining its last stage of resorting to terrorist crimes or violence. Even if radicalized, only a small number of individuals actually turn to violence to express their radical views. Holding views or beliefs – even if considered radical or extreme – as well as their peaceful expression are 29 not crimes. “Radicalization” and “extremism” in themselves should not, therefore, be objects for law enforcement counter-terrorism measures unless they are directly linked with violence or to another unlawful act (e.g., incitement to hatred). These acts need to 30 be precisely defined in domestic law, in compliance with international human rights law. In practice, legislation and related policies to counter so-called “extremism” have been arbitrarily (mis)used, including in the OSCE region, to clamp down on dissenting voices, such as political opponents, human rights defenders, journalists, members of religious 31 minorities and of civil society. Their implementation has also led to discrimination against 32 particular groups based on their gender, belief, religion or origin. Drivers of VERLT There is no single profile of a terrorist or violent extremist – the range of people becoming involved in VERLT is broad and heterogeneous. It is furthermore important to note that acts motivated by one specific violent extremist ideology are not increasing in any uniform 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 OSCE, Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism, op. cit., note 22, p. 15. UNODC, Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons, op. cit., note 2, p. 143. OSCE, Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism, op. cit., note 22, p. 36. Freedom of expression does not only protect the expression of views that are favorably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also those that “offend, shock or disturb” the state or any part of the population (Handyside v. United Kingdom, para. 49), i.e., it also protects expression that some may consider radical or extreme. For a discussion on the necessity of intent to commit an act of terrorism and how regulations instead often target legitimate exercise of freedom of expression and freedom of religion, see: UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism, “Human Rights Impact of Policies and Practices Aimed at Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, op. cit., note 25, para. 26. See also: ODIHR, Guidelines for Addressing the Threats and Challenges of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” within a Human Rights Framework, op. cit., note 23, p. 55-57. See for example, OSCE, Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism, op. cit., note 22, pp. 42-43. ODIHR, Guidelines for Addressing the Threats and Challenges of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” within a Human Rights Framework, op. cit., note 23, p. 54. UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism, “Human Rights Impact of Policies and Practices Aimed at Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, op. cit., note 25, para. 15, para. 24, para. 28. On this issue, see also: ODIHR, Freedom of Religion or Belief and Security: Policy Guidance, (Warsaw: ODIHR, 2019). 17