bodies in the OSCE region have secured access to high-security detention facilities where suspected or sentenced violent extremist prisoners are being – or most probably 104 will be – held. Unhindered access to private and fully confidential interviews (without the presence of prison staff or under surveillance of any kind) with all prisoners, regardless of the charges against them, the sentences they are serving or their security status, 105 must be granted to NPMs, as well as to other monitoring bodies. Similarly, NPMs and other detention monitoring bodies should be able to conduct private and fully confidential interviews with prison staff and other relevant people (e.g., healthcare staff or other service providers working in the prison). If access is impeded, NPMs are encouraged to notify the UN Subcommittee for the Prevention of Torture. CSOs may also produce monitoring reports based on desk research and interviews with former detainees, among others, to compensate for any lack of access to closed institutions or to individual prisoners. Amnesty International and the Open Society Justice Initiative, for example, reported that they have declined meetings requested by prisoners of the Terroristenafdeling (TA), the special high-security detention section in the Netherlands that holds people suspected or convicted of terrorism offences, because of restrictive conditions proposed by the authorities (e.g., the monitoring and recording 106 of their interviews). Nonetheless, the organizations published an analysis based on research and interviews with former detainees, family members of detainees and lawyers, as well as with relevant experts, officials and others. Detention monitors may also face a lack of co-operation from prisoners or a reluctance on their part to interact with them, sometimes as a sign of defiance. The prisoners might perceive the monitoring body as associated with the authorities or fear that they could 107 face reprisals for speaking to monitors. There are prisoners who are prepared to speak to monitors. In France, for example, the NPM noted prisoners’ readiness to meet with 108 them – 61 out of the 64 detainees held in “dedicated units” were willing to be interviewed. In relation to VERLT, some prison management and staff may demonstrate a lower level of co-operation, given the sensitivity of the issue being addressed, while others might perceive co-operation in this area as of the same nature as on any other topic. Based on a 2015 French NPM report, it appears that prison authorities and staff viewed its visits as opportunities to share their viewpoint – sometimes disregarded – to correct some misconceptions about VERLT in prisons and to shed some light on the challenges they 109 face. 104 The Kazakh NPM has, for instance, secured its access to the detention facilities under the National Security Committee, where national security detainees (including, most probably, detainees held in relation to terrorism-related charges and offences) are kept. See for instance, the 2016 Annual Report of the Kazakh NPM (in Russian only), Section 3. 105 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 26 June 1987, Articles 4 and 20; SPT, Guidelines on National Preventive Mechanisms, 9 December 2010, CAT/OP/12/5, para. 25. 106 Amnesty International and Open Society Justice Initiative, “Inhuman and Unnecessary Human Rights Violations in Dutch High-Security Prisons in the Context of Counter Terrorism”, October 2017, p. 12. 107 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism, Visit to Kazakhstan, A/HRC/43/46/Add.1, 22 January 2020, para. 29-31. 108 Contrôleur général des lieux de privation de liberté (CGLPL), “Radicalization islamiste en milieu carcéral: les unités dédiées ouvertes en 2016”, 7 June 2016, p. 4. 109 CGLPL, “La prise en charge de la radicalization islamiste en milieu carcéral”, 2015, op. cit., note 54. 28