role in children’s radicalization to terrorism or violence, providing a networking platform 48 that can aid the recruitment process. At the UN and OSCE level, states have underscored the need to promote human rights and the rule of law in all counter-terrorism measures while, at the same time, addressing 49 the conditions conducive to terrorism and VERLT, with the aim of prevention. Efforts have, however, long focused largely on law enforcement measures to tackle terrorism and VERLT, without addressing their drivers. The international community is increasingly stressing the necessity to adopt a more comprehensive approach towards “preventing” 50 violent extremism. This should include preventing any period spent in prison from being conducive to VERLT. 1.2 Understanding VERLT inside prisons Prisons are often considered as incubators of VERLT; there have been highly publicized cases of individuals being involved in terrorist acts after having spent time in prison. Prisons are often portrayed as “safe havens” in which terrorist groups can network, recruit 51 new followers, exchange tactics or even plot deadly attacks outside prisons. In fact, the likelihood of VERLT originating or developing in prisons remains difficult to assess and should not be overstated. Concerns about the perceived potential for radicalization to terrorism in certain settings like prisons seems to guide public debate on this topic more 52 than actual radicalization to terrorism. There is a distinct lack of empirical and qualitative data to help thoroughly understand whether an individual’s radicalization started, was accelerated or otherwise reinforced in prisons. Recent research in the European context suggests that (suspected) violent extremist prisoners in most cases only make up a very small percentage of the general 48 49 50 51 52 20 ODIHR, “Youth Engagement to Counter Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: Report on Findings and Recommendations”, July 2013, p. 4. See also: OSCE, Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism, op. cit., note 22, p. 37. “UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy”, op. cit., note 4, Pillars I and IV; OSCE, “Ministerial Statement on Supporting the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy”, op. cit., note 4. “Addressing “pull factors” has broadly fallen into the domain of countering violent extremism. Interventions relevant to preventing violent extremism are most usefully defined as those that seek to address the structural drivers of violent extremism, or “push factors”. Where preventing and countering violent extremism includes both security and development, there is a need to ensure a balanced approach that does not privilege the former over the latter”, UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism, “Human Rights Impact of Policies and Practices Aimed at Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, op. cit., note 25, para. 10. EUROPOL, “European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report,” op. cit., note 33, p. 13; Rajan Basra and Peter Neumann, Prisons and Terrorism: Extremist Offender Management in 10 European Countries, (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation [ICSR], 2020), p. 15; ICCT, “Roundtable Expert Meeting and Conference on Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders: Core Principles and Good Practices (background paper)”, February 2012, p. 1. For further reading to do with (unfounded) fears about the extent of violent radicalization in prisons and recidivism, see: Andrew Silke, “Physical Facilitating Environments – Prisons and Madrassas: Mechanisms and Vehicles of Violent Radicalization,” in Anthony Richards et al. eds., Jihadist Terror: New Threats, New Responses (London: IB Tauris, 2019); Thomas Renard, “Overblown: Exploring the Gap Between the Fear of Terrorist Recidivism and the Evidence”, in CTC Sentinel, April 2020, Vol. 13, Issue 4.