inducements of preferential treatment within prison and improved possibilities of parole” restricts freedom of expression and of manifestation of belief on the discriminatory basis 420 of political opinion. Sanctioning the non-compliance of prisoners with the request to renounce their ideological convictions also goes against the prohibition of discrimination 421 on grounds of political or other opinion. Misuse of programmes for intelligence-gathering purposes The collection of personal information represents an interference with the right to privacy that has to be in conformity with the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality and non-discrimination, as is the case for all other rights limitations. Staff involved in the rehabilitation process (social workers, educators, religious representatives, psychologists, etc.) should, therefore, consider very carefully what information may be collected from prisoners and shared to avoid its subsequent use for any other purposes than for rehabilitation. They should also operate with strict autonomy and independence from those engaged in intelligence-gathering on (suspected) violent extremist prisoners or those deemed “at risk” of VERLT. The UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism has expressed concern that many different actors are being given responsibility for detecting “signs of radicalization”, and that this could interfere with their professional 422 ethical obligations. It has been noted that the involvement of prison staff with limited related training in counter-terrorism-related tasks (or the placement of intelligence staff among prison staff) can be problematic, lead to over-reporting and be detrimental to 423 the establishment of trusted relationships with prisoners. The duties of staff involved in this process and of intelligence-gathering officers should be clearly delineated and 424 separated. This is key to establishing genuine relations of trust and credibility, both of which are critical for the effectiveness of any rehabilitation and reintegration programme. Post-release protective measures for detainees and their families Upon release from prison, individuals who have disengaged from VERLT may face reprisals from the violent extremist groups to which they used to belong or from their families or communities. States should, therefore, put in place protective measures, including the 420 UN CCPR, Yong-Joo Kang v. Republic of Korea, 15 July 2003, CCPR/C/78/D/878/1999, para. 7.2. 421 UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, “Report on the Mission to the Republic of Korea”, E/CN.4/1996/39/Add.1, 21 November 1995, para. 25. 422 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism, A/HRC/43/46, op. cit., note 108, para. 32. 423 “The Challenges to the Preventive Monitoring under OPCAT in the Context of Counter-Terrorism and AntiRadicalization Measures”, op. cit., note 102, p. 6. 424 Council of Europe CDPC PC-CP, “Commentary by Francesco Ragazzi, Scientific Expert, to the Guidelines for Prison and Probation Services Regarding Radicalization and Violent Extremism”, op. cit., note 156, p. 6; Council of Europe, “Guidelines for Prison and Probation Services regarding Radicalisation and Violent Extremism”, op. cit., note 56, Guidelines 4-5. 84