PART B: Substantive Norms on Torture in the African Regional Human Rights System treatment and punishment as ‘examples’ of exploitation and degradation. Slavery, servitude and forced labour are usually dealt with under a separate article in other international conventions leaving open the possibility of a dual violation of the prohibition of slavery, servitude or forced labour and the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment or punishment. Notably, in the case of Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. Niger, the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice found that ‘it is trite that slavery may exist without the presence of torture’. However, although the Court found that the ‘condition of slavery has caused the Applicant undeniable physical, psychological and moral harm’, it found a violation of Article 5 on grounds of slavery but did not make a separate finding of torture or ill-treatment.169 The African Commission has clarified the meaning of ‘human dignity’ as ‘an inherent basic right to which all human beings, regardless of their mental capabilities or disabilities, are entitled to without discrimination. It is an inherent right which every State is obliged to respect and protect by all means possible’.170 In other cases when finding an Article 5 violation, the Commission has not distinguished between failure to respect ‘dignity’ and a violation of the prohibition of ‘torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment’.171 This limited analysis undermines attempts to come to a clear understanding of the distinct elements of Article 5. Not only are these two main elements often conflated, but the Commission does not always distinguish between acts that constitute ‘torture’ and acts that constitute ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading’ treatment or punishment, preferring to simply pronounce a violation of Article 5. This tendency is explained with reference to two main factors. The limited analysis is also part of a jurisprudential trend on the part of the Commission. Especially at the beginning, the Commission did not elaborate on its findings, but merely stated the essential facts and the applicable provision before making a simple conclusion about whether or not there had been a violation without attempting to show how the particular legal provisions relate or are applied to the specific facts.172 For example, in the case of Krishna Achuthan v. Malawi, the Commission did not specify whether the solitary confinement, shackling, extremely poor food quality and denial of access to medical care experienced by the victims 169 ECOWAS Court of Justice, Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. Niger, App. No. ECW/CCJ/APP/08/08. 170 See, e.g., ACHPR, Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v. Sudan, Comm. Nos. 279/03 & 296/05, 45th Ordinary Session (27 May 2009), para. 163; Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights & INTERIGHTS v. Egypt, Comm. No. 323/06, 10th Extraorindary Session (12 October 2013), para. 190. 171 See, e.g., Amnesty International and Others v. Sudan, Comm. Nos. 48/90, 50/91, 52/91, 89/93, para. 57. 172 See, e.g., ACHPR, Free Legal Assistance Group and Others v. Zaire, Comm. Nos. 25/89, 47/90, 56/91 & 100/93, 18th Ordinary Session (4 April 1996), para. 41 (‘The torture of 15 persons by a military unit … as alleged in [the] communication constitutes a violation of [Article 5]’). 49