PART C: Protection against Torture: Procedures before the African Commission and African Human Rights Court In Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights v. Zimbabwe, the State similarly challenged admissibility on grounds that the complaint did not meet the requirements under article 56(3) of the Charter as the language in the complaint was insulting. The Commission provided some clarification as to the threshold for such language: In determining whether a certain remark is disparaging or insulting and whether it has dampened the integrity of the judiciary, the Commission has to satisfy itself whether the said remark or language is aimed at unlawfully and intentionally violating the dignity, reputation or integrity of a judicial officer or body and whether it is used in a manner calculated to pollute the minds of the public or any reasonable man to cast aspersions on and weaken public confidence on the administration of justice. The language must be aimed at undermining the integrity and status of the institution and bring it into disrepute. To this end, Article 56(3) must be interpreted bearing in mind Article 9(2) of the African Charter, which provides that “every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the law”. A balance must be struck between the right to speak freely and the duty to protect state institutions to ensure that while discouraging abusive language, the African Commission is not at the same time violating or inhibiting the enjoyment of other rights guaranteed in the African Charter, such as in this case, the right to freedom of expression.357 Though the Commission in this case did not find the language in the complaint to be disparaging and insulting under Article 56(3) of the Charter, it is advisable for authors to describe the acts constituting violations of rights in less polarizing language and let the Commission to make conclusions regarding the gravity of the conduct or the depravity of the persons implicated . e. The Complaint Should Not Be Based Exclusively on Media Reports Article 56(4) of the Charter lays down, as a condition for admissibility, the requirement that authors must ensure that their communications ‘are not based exclusively on news disseminated through the mass media’. The African Commission considered the import of this requirement for the first time in Sir Dawda K. Jawara v. The Gambia.358 Among other objections to ex-President Jawara’s communication, the Government of The Gambia claimed that his communication was based on information from the news media. While acknowledging that it would be dangerous to rely exclusively on news disseminated by the media, the Commission reasoned:359 [I]t would be equally damaging if the Commission were to reject a communication because some aspects of it are based on news disseminated through the mass media. 357 ACHPR, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights & Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe v. Zimbabwe, Comm. No. 284/03, 6th Extraordinary Session (3 April 2009), para. 96. See also, e.g., ACHPR, Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre v. Sudan, Comm. No. 310/05, paras. 68-69. 358 ACHPR, Sir Dawda K. Jawara v. The Gambia, Comm. Nos. 147/95 & 149/96, 27th Ordinary Session (11 May 2000). 359 Ibid., paras. 24-26. 87