CCPR/C/117/D/2378/2014 and their children have suffered in Denmark, or related to an area over which Danish authorities are in effective control, but rather on consequences that they would allegedly suffer if returned to Italy. The Committee accordingly lacks jurisdiction over the relevant violations in respect of Denmark, and this part of the communication is incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant. Article 1 of the Optional Protocol provides that the Committee has competence to receive and consider communications from individuals who are subject to the jurisdiction of a State party and who claim to be victims of a violation by the State party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. Extraditing, deporting, expelling or otherwise removing a person who is afraid of having his rights violated under articles 17 and 24 of the Covenant by another State would not cause such irreparable harm as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. 7 Accordingly, that part of the communication should be rejected as inadmissible ratione loci and ratione materiae, pursuant to rule 96 (d), read together with rule 96 (a) of the Committee’s rules of procedure and article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 4.4 The State party provided a detailed description of the asylum proceedings under the Aliens Act and the decision-making process and functioning of the Refugee Appeals Board.8 4.5 Should the Committee declare the communication admissible, the State party maintains that article 7 of the Covenant would not be violated if the authors and their three minor children were returned to Italy. The State party notes that the authors did not provide the Committee with information or views on their circumstances beyond the information already relied upon during the asylum proceedings. The Refugee Appeals Board found that: the authors fell under section 7 (2) of the Aliens Act (protection status); they had been granted temporary residence in Italy in 2009, as a consequence of their allegation of persecution in Somalia; and they could enter Italy and take up lawful residence while applying for renewal of their residence permits. In that regard, the Board referred to the background information on conditions for asylum seekers in Italy, including the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Samsam Mohammed Hussein and others v. the Netherlands and Italy, and found that Italy could serve as the authors’ country of first asylum. It thus upheld the decision of the Danish Immigration Service of 20 December 2013 to refuse asylum to the authors pursuant to section 7 (3) of the Aliens Act. 4.6 When applying the principle of country of first asylum, the Refugee Appeals Board requires, at a minimum, that the asylum seeker be protected against refoulement and that he or she be able to legally enter and take up lawful residence in the country of first asylum. Such protection includes certain social and economic elements, given that asylum seekers must be treated in accordance with basic human rights standards and their personal integrity be protected. The core element of such protection is that they must enjoy personal safety, both upon entering and while staying in the country of first asylum. The State party considers, however, that it is not possible to require that asylum seekers have the exact same social and living standards as nationals of a country. It is a mandatory minimum requirement that the asylum seeker be protected against being returned to the country of persecution or to a country in which the asylum seeker is not protected against return to the country of persecution. 4.7 In response to the authors’ allegations that they would not have access to accommodation in Italy and consequently have no way of attaining a minimum standard of living, the State party recalls that in Samsam Mohammed Hussein and others v. the Netherlands and Italy, the European Court of Human Rights observed that persons granted subsidiary protection would be provided with a residence permit valid for three years, and renewable by the territorial commission that had granted it. The Court ruled that, in the absence of exceptionally compelling humanitarian grounds against removal, the fact that the applicant’s material and social living conditions would be significantly reduced if he or she were to be removed is not sufficient in itself to give rise to a breach of article 3 of the 7 8 6 The State party refers to the Committee’s general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant. For a full description, see communication No. 2379/2014, Hussein Ahmed et al v. Denmark, Views adopted on 7 July 2016, paras. 4.1-4.4. GE.17-20685