CAT/C/68/D/826/2017 law does not specify whether this remedy has suspensive effect, the real possibility of the complainant being able to invoke his grievance during the proceedings and the fact that the State party provides no examples of applications for revocation having been filed and cites no specific examples of jurisprudence clarifying the suspensive nature and the urgency of applications for revocation,23 the Committee is not in a position to conclude that the fact that the complainant did not submit an application for revocation prevents him from submitting his complaint to the Committee. 24 Therefore, since the application for revocation does not allow the complainant to invoke an actual violation of a right and owing to its exceptional nature and lack of suspensive effect, the Committee concludes that this remedy is not effective and even less useful. In the circumstances of the present case, the Committee finds that article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention does not preclude it from declaring the communication admissible. 6.4 The Committee also notes that the State party has challenged the admissibility of the complaint on the grounds of insufficient substantiation, since the complainant alleges that the extradition request from Turkey was political in nature. However, the Committee notes the complainant’s argument that he would be at risk if extradited, as a person related to the Fethullah terrorist organization/Parallel State Structure, which has been described as a terrorist group by the Turkish Government. The Committee therefore finds that the complainant has sufficiently substantiated his complaint for the purposes of admissibility. 6.5 The Committee accordingly finds that the communication is admissible under article 22 of the Convention with respect to the alleged violation of article 3 and proceeds to consider it on the merits. Consideration of the merits 7.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention. 7.2 In the present case, the issue before the Committee is whether the complainant’s extradition to Turkey would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 (1) of the Convention not to expel or to return (“refouler”) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. The Committee recalls that the prohibition of torture is absolute and non-derogable and that no exceptional circumstances whatsoever may be invoked by a State party to justify acts of torture. 25 The principle of “non-refoulement” of persons to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to torture, in accordance with article 3 of the Convention, is also absolute.26 7.3 In assessing whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the alleged victim would be in danger of being subjected to torture, the Committee recalls that, under article 3 (2) of the Convention, States parties must take into account all relevant considerations, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in the country to which he or she would be returned. In this case, however, the Committee must determine whether the complainant runs a personal risk of being subjected to torture if he is extradited to Turkey. The existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that the complainant would be in danger of being subjected to torture if he is extradited to this country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. 27 Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 28 23 24 25 26 27 28 GE.19-22197 Ibid., para. 6.3. See Erdoğan v. Morocco (CAT/C/66/D/846/2017), para. 8.3. See the Committee’s general comment No. 2 (2007) on the implementation of article 2 by States parties, para. 5. Committee’s general comment No. 4, para. 9. See Alhaj Ali v. Morocco, para. 8.3; R.A.Y. v. Morocco, para. 7.2; and L.M. v. Canada (CAT/C/63/D/488/2012), para. 11.3. Kalinichenko v. Morocco, para. 15.3. 7