CAT/OP/ECU/2 completely surrounded by persons deprived of their liberty. The Subcommittee noted that, in the event of an emergency, the team could have been cornered and unable to reach an exit. 58. The Subcommittee recommends that the national preventive mechanism, in consultation with a security specialist, develop protocols and provide its staff with security training. The Subcommittee recommends that, at the beginning of a visit, the national preventive mechanism team carefully consider the security -related restrictions proposed by the staff of the establishment and request information on recent incidents and the measures taken in response to such situations. 59. During the visit to the centre of deprivation of liberty in Cotopaxi, a team decided to conduct a group interview in an enclosed area where several access corridors to the cells met and where some 200 persons deprived of their liberty had gathered. In order to conduct the interview, the interviewer had to step up onto an elevated area in order to make himself heard. However, given the large number of persons present, his efforts were unsuccessful and the persons deprived of their liberty started to show signs of impatience and disgruntlement. The Subcommittee is of the view that this type of interview not only does not yield any positive results because it does not allow for addressing any subject in an even remotely serious or in -depth manner, but may also place the physical safety of the national preventive mechanism team at risk. 60. The Subcommittee recommends that, before deciding to hold a group interview, the national preventive mechanism seriously evaluate the circumstances in which it would be held, the usefulness and relevance of such an interview and the possible security implications. 61. The Subcommittee notes with satisfaction that, during the interviews with persons deprived of their liberty, the national preventive mechanism undertook an in depth review of the material conditions and the regime applied in the place of detention. However, the Subcommittee is of the view that the national preventive mechanism could also take a closer look at systemic and institutional shortcomings. For example, two of the inmates who were interviewed in the Cotopaxi centre said that their visits had been suspended. Another prisoner in the same centre reported that he had completed his eight-year sentence the previous week but remained deprived of his liberty and had not received any notice of an order for his release. The national preventive mechanism team did not try to ascertain the veracity of those reports, find out what the reasons for these situations were or identify possible solutions. 62. In the view of the Subcommittee, the situations described would merit several follow-up questions and, if possible, a review of the records to corroborate the information and identify possible patterns of violations of the human rights of persons deprived of their liberty. The Subcommittee recommends that the national preventive mechanism use the interviews to take a closer look at structural aspects of the system of deprivation of liberty in order to collect information and thus be in a position to undertake a comprehensive, substantiated analysis of institutional, legal and public policy risk factors. 63. The Subcommittee welcomes the practice of the national preventive mechanism staff of sharing the findings among the team and deciding on priority issues as a group before submitting their comments to the director of the institution concerned. 64. During the visit to the regional centre of Cotopaxi, the Subcommittee noted that the main complaints about material conditions made by persons deprived of their liberty had to do with the lack and quality of drinking water and heating. The Subcommittee wishes to emphasize that, had there been a doctor on the team, he or she could have established whether there was a correlation between these 14/20 GE.15-11962