CRPD/C/23/D/60/2019 Annex Individual opinion of Committee member László Gábor Lovászy (dissenting) 1. I am unable to join the Committee’s decision as I do not share its position that it has been substantiated that the State party has failed to fulfil its obligations under article 15 of the Convention on the basis of the argument adopted in paragraph 5.2 of the Committee’s Views. 2. From a general perspective, the overall and full application of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the 1951 Convention) for all parties seems to have been neglected by the Committee. It is also problematic that the Committee, by referring to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Paposhvili v. Belgium, found that the notion of a significant reduction in life expectancy shall be applied without clear and reasonable restriction. 3. When it comes to article 2 (d) of the Optional Protocol, in terms of the abuse of the right of submission of the communication, the medical documentation submitted by the author did not support the assumption that her illness was serious enough to grant her a residence permit and she did not mention any symptoms of her illness at the beginning of the asylum-seeking process either. The author later notes that her condition was described as life-threatening in the medical certificates she submitted to the State party’s migration authorities. The Committee is not in the position to evaluate whether these medical certificates are professionally validated or relevant; however, the State party had not questioned them either. The author claimed that she had provided these documents, but the relevant authority did not consider them as decisive and made their final decisions, which were not challenged by the author in terms of domestic remedies. In relation to this final decision, there is no reasonable doubt that the application of the remedies would be unreasonably prolonged or unlikely to bring effective relief in the State party of Sweden. Hence, the author failed to exhaust all available domestic remedies. 4. When it comes to articles 2 (b) and (e) of the Optional Protocol, it is crucial to record that the author was granted a French visa before entering Sweden. On 13 March 2013, the Swedish Agency informed her that it would request the French authorities to assume responsibility for the examination of her asylum application in accordance with the Dublin regulations, which was not disputed by the author. Upon acceptance by the French authorities of the Agency’s request, the Agency accordingly decided on 5 June 2013 to reject the author’s application for asylum and to transfer her back to France in accordance with the Dublin regulations. This argument together with the facts were not challenged by the author. However, the stipulated time frame for enforcing the transfer order expired on 7 November 2014 without the complainant traveling to France. By violating and not respecting the French and Swedish authorities’ decisions and legal provisions, it would seem that the author did not have the intention of leaving for France to undergo the examination of her asylum application. The author has failed to explain why she did not leave, which also means that it seems that she intended to remain in Sweden by violating the Dublin regulations. Based on the neglected argument, it should be evident that the applicant must cooperate with the State party in accordance with the 1951 Convention – articles 2, 31 and 32 in particular – since Sweden was not the first country that the applicant had entered within the European Union in accordance with the Dublin regulations. Hence, the author violated the 1951 Convention and international law. 5. When it comes to article 2 (b) of the Optional Protocol, in terms of the abuse of the right of submission in particular, and given the fact that the author had accepted the final decision of the Swedish authority, it is also crucial to record that at the beginning of her procedure she claimed that she was even eligible and fit to teach in Sweden. Even though the Committee notes that the parties were in disagreement on the severity of the author’s health condition and whether it is lasting in nature (para. 7.8), she only challenged the procedure of expulsion by citing the mentioned decisions of the Human Rights Council and the European Court of Human Rights. The author further claimed that her illness had 12