CAT/C/61/D/625/2014 into account that, as he indicated to the authorities of the State party, he could not remember many events clearly because of the blows he suffered to his head while being tortured. Therefore, by denying him a medical examination, the Board did not respect the principle of the “benefit of the doubt”, and applied a wrong standard of proof. The complainant further submits that it is not possible to obtain a medical certificate indicating that a person has been tortured because of his or her activities. Application of the principle of the “benefit of the doubt” and the possibility to undergo a medical examination to confirm that torture had taken place were essential in his case. 32 The complainant also indicates that the State party’s authorities have authorized this kind of medical examination in only two cases during the year 2015.33 He claims that, taking into account that, in 2015, the number of asylum applications was very high, it is questionable that the authorities should only have found it necessary to carry out medical examinations in such a limited number of cases.34 5.6 The complainant further indicates that, according to a new bill introduced into Parliament amending the Acts on Legal Aid and the Administration of Justice in respect of lodging and pursuing complaints with the international complaints bodies set up under human rights conventions, cases like his are excluded from legal aid. According to this bill, when the Board decides not to authorize a medical examination, this cannot be invoked as a ground to submit a complaint to the Committee. State party’s further submission 6.1 On 29 March 2017, the State party reiterated that the complaint was inadmissible and that it did not disclose any violation of the Convention. It further indicates that in his comments, the complainant has not provided any new information on the grounds for his asylum application, in particular in relation to his conflicts in his country of origin. It refers to R.K. v. Australia,35 in which the Committee indicated that the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion, and that while the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable, the burden of proof generally falls on the complainant, who must present an arguable case that he or she faces a foreseeable, real and personal risk. In addition, considerable weight should be given to the findings of the organs of the State party concerned. The State party further argues that the complainant has failed to establish that the assessment made by the Board was arbitrary or amounted to manifest error or a denial of justice, and reiterates that the complainant has also failed to identify any irregularity committed by the authorities during his asylum proceedings. 36 6.2 The State party refers to S.A.P. v. Switzerland,37 in which the Committee considered that, although the complainants alleged that they had suffered serious injuries and posttraumatic stress disorder as a result of persecution in their country of origin, they had not provided sufficient evidence to allow it to conclude that such injuries had been caused by the alleged acts of persecution by the authorities of their country of origin. 38 6.3 The State party further notes that, even in cases in which medical examinations, including those carried out by Amnesty International Danish Medical Group, indicate that the injuries of an asylum seeker are consistent with his or her statements in relation to torture, if the Board disregards the asylum seeker’s account because it cannot in any way be considered as fact that either he or she has been involved in politics or that any such 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 8 The complainant refers to F.K. v. Denmark. See para. 5.2 above. The complainant does not provide further information on this matter. Ibid. See communication No. 609/2014, R.K. v. Australia, decision adopted on 11 August 2016, para. 8.4. The State party refers to the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee, according to which it is generally for the organs of the State party to review and evaluate facts and evidence in order to determine whether a risk exists, unless it is found that the national authorities’ evaluation was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. See communications No. 2378/2014, A.S.M et al. v. Denmark, Views adopted on 7 July 2016; No. 2272/2013, P.T. v. Denmark, Views adopted on 1 April 2015; and No. 2426/2014, N. v. Denmark, decision adopted on 23 July 2015. See communication No. 565/2013, S.A.P. et al. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 25 November 2015, para. 7.4. See M.O. v. Denmark and Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, para. 4.7.