CAT/C/21/D/66/1997 page 7 assumed jurisdiction there was no assurance that an effective remedy was available. Having assumed jurisdiction the Committee ought to continue its review of the matter, despite the fact that the author was granted stay. 5.2 The author sought judicial review of the finding that he was a danger to the public but the Federal Court dismissed the application for leave on 19 January 1998. The refugee claim is barred from proceeding once the Minister certifies that the author is a danger to the public. There is absolutely no appeal from the decision of the Court denying leave. Thus, the author will not be able to have his refugee claim determined and hence there is not nor will there ever be a refugee determination for him. As a result, no risk assessment will be made since this is only conducted in the context of the refugee determination process. 5.3 At the same time the Federal Court - Trial Division, by decision dated 29 June 1998 quashed the decision of the immigration officer to execute the removal order. However, the Court did not conclude that a risk assessment had to be done. It stated that removal officers do not have jurisdiction to conduct risk assessments and make risk determinations in the course of making destination decisions. However, under section 48 of the Immigration Act removal officers have a discretion to delay the execution of a deportation order. In the Court’s opinion the removal officer’s failure to consider whether or not to exercise his or her discretion under section 48 of the Immigration Act, pending the conducting of an appropriate risk assessment and the making of an appropriate risk determination constituted a reviewable error. An appeal against that decision was filed by the Minister before the Federal Court of Appeal. No hearing date has been set yet. If the Minister is not successful in the appeal the matter is merely referred back to the expulsions officer for his determination as to whether or not the author’s removal should be deferred pending a risk assessment. However, since the author has already been certified as a danger to the public there is no statutory requirement for a risk assessment. Therefore, this remedy cannot be considered as effective. It would then be open to the author to make an application on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. Such an application is a request for the exercise of special discretion before an immigration officer who can nevertheless consider risk. 5.4 Although the author was held in detention for a period of over two years he was ordered released by an immigration adjudicator in July 1998. Since then he has complied with all conditions for his release, has not committed any criminal offence and has not posed a danger to the public in any way. 5.5 With respect to the substantial grounds counsel argues that section 46.01 (e) (i) of the Immigration Act allows the Minister to certify a person as a “danger to the public in Canada”. However, it does not require that the Minister assess risk. Although it is true that the author did make submissions with respect to risk there is no indication in any of the material that the author saw from the Minister that risk was in fact assessed. The author has not seen any documentation which would support the bare assertion by the Minister that there was a “minimal risk”. If this is in fact the case it is clearly a matter that was not relevant to the certification process. In that context counsel submits that it is extremely important that the Committee make a determination as to whether or not the certification process engaged