68 Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on terrorism, counter-terrorism and human rights and increased multi-lateral cooperation on counter-terrorism issues, mean that intelligence will remain a key tool in domestic and international counter-terrorism efforts for the foreseeable future. As such, it is vital that States take stock and ensure that the new significance accorded to intelligence does not lead to a transfer of power to unaccountable bodies, that it does not undermine the separation of powers and rule of law, and that appropriate safeguards are built in to avoid such eventualities. This chapter will explore the practical implications of the centrality given to intelligence, the human rights violations that have arisen, and the safeguards required to ensure that effective and accountable intelligence bodies keep everyone safer in future. The risk of abuse Intelligence, by its very nature, poses potential risks to human rights and the rule of law. Nevertheless, it is worth considering briefly how and under what conditions these risks could become more imminent. First, there is the question of secrecy. It is both necessary and legitimate for intelligence operations to be secret, and for intelligence agencies to protect sources. Granted this need for secrecy, there is no reason, in principle, why intelligence agencies should not be answerable for their actions. The rule of law requires transparency, not necessarily in terms of detailed operations and operational methods, but in terms of who makes decisions, how those decisions are made, and what safeguards exist to prevent, or subsequently punish, corruption, misuse, or illegality. Arrangements for accountability must therefore be essential features of intelligence structures, if the risk of secrecy is to be mitigated. A second potential for abuse arises with the accretion of power by the executive. Intelligence bodies routinely report to the executive of the day, often with limited or no lines of accountability to the legislature, or judicial scrutiny. Post 9/11, this study confirms that intelligence agencies around the world have acquired new resources and new powers allowing for increased surveillance, and law enforcement measures (e.g. powers of arrest, detention and interrogation).144 Executives may act expediently, at least in the short term, by accruing power and privileging intelligence over law enforcement approaches, precisely because of the lack of accountability to others. Last but not least, the risk of abuse increases with greater cooperation among intelligence agencies. The level of domestic safeguards and human rights compliance varies considerably, and effective international oversight is limited. The Security Council and regional bodies have rightly encouraged the exchange of information; the same resolutions demand that such cooperation respect international human rights and, where applicable, international humanitarian law.145 However, in theory 144 See also Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Report on the Democratic Oversight of the Security Services, CDL-AD(2007)016, 11 June 2007. 145 See UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), adopted on 28 September 2001, para. 3 (a) and (b), UN