Assessing Damage, Urging Action is unclear or disputed.180 Participants from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Pakistan alleged that detention facilities used by the security services were not acknowledged, not listed as official places of detention and were not under the effective control of civilian authorities. In other countries, such as Algeria, the military intelligence agency exercises judicial police powers, and is formally subject to the control of the judiciary or the public prosecutor, but those controls were often said to be ineffective. In Morocco, for example, the Panel heard consistent reports of terrorist suspects (especially after the 2003 Casablanca attacks) being held in an unacknowledged detention facility in Témara (outside Rabat), run by the Direction de la surveillance du territoire (Directorate of Territorial Surveillance: DST). Many allegations have been made of incommunicado detention, ill-treatment and torture.181 As the centre is not listed as a detention facility under the authority of the Ministry of Justice, it is not routinely inspected. Participants conveyed a strong sense that the intelligence services act with great impunity, unaccountable to either the courts or the parliament. Elsewhere in North Africa, the Panel was informed that Algeria’s military intelligence, the Département du renseignement et de la sécurité (Department for Information and Security: DRS), has authority under the criminal procedural code to exercise the powers of the judicial police. Technically therefore the DRS operates under some civilian control, when exercising judicial police functions. However, in practice there was a wide consensus amongst witnesses that the services are acting without restraint, and the DRS has been accused of involvement in torture, and large scale enforced disappearances (both now and in the past). There continue to be serious allegations of the detention of suspects in unacknowledged places of detention, and de facto administrative detention by placing people in “assigned residence” in military compounds. The Panel was told that the Charter on Reconciliation adopted in September 2005 fails to recognise the responsibility of the security services for serious human rights violations. Subsequent Presidential decrees implementing the Charter preclude any criminal investigation for past human rights violations by the 180 In Jordan, different views were raised in the Hearing as to the legal authority for officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID) to arrest and detain persons suspected of terrorism: no explicit legal basis for these powers exist, but the Court of Appeal has treated intelligence officers as qualifying as judicial officers. In Morocco, there was a lack of clarity as to whether the intelligence services have legal authority to detain and arrest terrorist suspects. Government representatives denied that the detention and interrogation of terrorism suspects occur outside the ordinary framework of law enforcement detention, but held that intelligence agents can provide assistance to law enforcement operations, and certain officers have a dual role. In Pakistan, the powers of the ISI are not regulated by any legislation, so there is no clear legal basis for the ISI to detain and arrest individuals. 181 Several detainees rendered to Morocco by the United States, and former detainees from Guantánamo Bay have also reportedly been held under the authority of the DST in Témara. 77