CAT/C/52/2 61. Special attention must also be given to solitary confinement, which may only be used as an exceptional disciplinary sanction of last resort and for a restricted period. Both its use and the manner in which it is implemented must be subject to stringent controls. Non-discrimination 62. Decisions concerning the particular modalities of a detention regime should be based on individualized risk assessments, conduct while in detention and other relevant objective factors. Approaches based on labelling or categorizing prisoners according to general psychological profiles, on the nature of their criminal record or on perceptions of the danger they would pose to society if they were not in prison can deprive them of the enjoyment of their rights on the basis of equality, thus constituting a form of discrimination. (b) Working group on reprisals 63. The Subcommittee is naturally concerned that its visits frequently lead to reprisals, that is, acts or omissions that permit “any sanction against any person or organization for having communicated to the Subcommittee on Prevention or to its delegates any information, whether true or false”.8 The Subcommittee attaches the highest priority to preventing reprisals and meeting its commitment to do no harm. 64. The Subcommittee is seeking to develop a proactive policy that asserts its uncompromising commitment to preventing reprisals. When finalized, the policy will be a public document and will inform the manner in which the Subcommittee engages with those with whom it works and cooperates. 65. It is therefore suggested that, prior to any visit, the Subcommittee will consider the track record of the relevant State with regard to reprisals, appoint a member of the Subcommittee delegation as the focal point for reprisals, and ask the State to distribute a fact-sheet on reprisals and the Subcommittee’s reprisals policy to all relevant interlocutors. Areas of concern would be raised by the Subcommittee with the State party, either by letter or in a meeting with the State party’s Permanent Mission in Geneva. 66. If, during a visit, the Subcommittee is made aware of reprisals carried out by the State party, it might implement one or more measures. Such measures might include communicating with the appropriate Government or with officials responsible for the facilities in question and highlighting areas of concern; communicating with the diplomatic missions of other States parties; conducting follow-up visits to monitor the situation, or asking local NPMs or specialized non-governmental organizations to conduct such visits; adapting interview techniques; requesting the intervention of other United Nations bodies; speaking to the local or international media; and, in extreme cases, withdrawing the Subcommittee’s delegation from the country. 67. Following each visit, the delegation’s focal point for reprisals would be responsible for following up on the Subcommittee’s concerns and advising the head of delegation of any measures that needed to be implemented to prevent reprisals. The Subcommittee would then cooperate with all relevant United Nations bodies and other regional mechanisms to ensure that reprisals were prevented. It would do this by keeping States parties to the 8 14 term of uncertain scope (title and rules 1, 8, 22 (1) and (2), and 94; (b) in a medical sense, relating to detainees who are unwell (rules 22 (1), 23 (1), 44, 82 (4) and 83; and (c) as a description of a corrective/therapeutic approach to detainees (rules 28 (2), 35 (1), 55, 59, 61, 63 (1) and (3), 65, 67 (b), 68, 70 and 75 (2). It is the latter use of the word which is of concern to the Subcommittee. Optional Protocol, art. 15.