CCPR/C/114/D/2343/2014 of Ultras Ahlawy, he would be killed or imprisoned by the Egyptian authorities if he returned to Egypt. The author also referred to the fact that his mother had been contacted at her home by the police and the military, who had asked for the author and searched her home, and presented several general articles and reports from the Internet and a printout of his Facebook profile, on which he had posted that he would be returned to Egypt on 12 February 2014. On 10 February 2014, the Board dismissed the request to reopen the asylum proceedings stating, inter alia, that it had not found any grounds for reopening the case or extending the time limit for the author’s departure. The Board took into consideration that no substantial new information or views beyond the information available at the original hearing by the Board had been submitted. The Board thus relied on its decision of 17 December 2013 and observed that the author had not been able either to support by evidence the information about the Egyptian authorities having turned up at his mother’s home or to substantiate why the authorities would visit his mother to look for him. The Board also observed that the author had departed from his country of origin legally on 15 October 2012. The Board further observed that the general reports and articles produced by the author did not contain information substantiating the allegation that the author was personally persecuted by the authorities or anyone else in his country of origin. Accordingly, the Board found that the author did not meet the conditions for being granted a residence permit under section 7 of the Aliens Act. 4.6 Concerning article 19, the State party considers that the author’s claim is insufficiently substantiated because he submitted that he had not previously had any conflicts with the Egyptian authorities, and that he had only availed himself of his right to freedom of expression. The State party further considers that the author’s claim under article 19 is inadmissible as incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant because article 19 does not have extraterritorial application. The author’s allegations of a violation of this provision do not rest on any treatment that he has suffered in Denmark, but rather on consequences that he will allegedly suffer if returned to Egypt. The European Court of Human Rights has clearly stressed the exceptional character of the right of extraterritorial protection contained in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.9 The State party in this regard argues that the Committee has never considered a complaint on its merits regarding the deportation of a person who feared violation of other provisions than articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant in the receiving State. 4.7 For the foregoing reasons, the State party considers that the communication is also without merit. Author’s comments on the State party’s observations 5.1 On 3 September 2014, the author submitted his comments on the State party’s observations. He maintains that his claims under articles 1 and 2 of the Covenant are wellsubstantiated with a vast amount of documentation relating to his activities with the Ultras Ahlawy, both presenting his status and function in the group and the group’s opinions and work. He stresses that, although the State party has noted that the author stated he was not a member of any political party or organization, he thereafter pointed out that he is the “brains” behind Ultras Ahlawy, together with three other friends, and explained how this group developed from focusing only on sport to later including participation in political activities. The author argues that the State party does not understand how a group that was initially cultural could later become political without affiliating itself with any political organizations. He maintains that Ultras Ahlawy is mainly a sport fan club, but that it also fights against corruption and stands for freedom of speech, which are typical political 9 The State party cites, inter alia, Soering v. the United Kingdom, application No. 14038/88. 7