CAT/C/31/D/199/2002 Page 14 is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he would be returned. It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute a sufficient ground for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to that country; additional grounds must exist to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Similarly, the absence of a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights does not mean that a person cannot be considered to be in danger of being subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 12.3 In the present case, the Committee observes that the complainant’s husband, Mr. A, was returned to Egypt in December 2001, almost two years prior to the Committee’s consideration of the case. The Committee observes that Mr. A’s detention has since been monitored by regular visits from the State party’s ambassador, Embassy staff and high-level representatives of the State party, as well as his family, and that his medical care and conditions of detention were reported to be adequate. The Committee observes that the complainant founds her allegation of a risk of torture solely on her relationship with her husband, Mr. A, and contends that she will be exposed to torture as a result of this link. The Committee refers in this respect to its previous jurisprudence where it rejected a claim of torture arising by virtue of a family relationship to the leadership of an allegedly terrorist organization – such family ties, of themselves, are generally insufficient to ground a claim under article 3.4 In light of the passage of time, the Committee is also satisfied by the provision of guarantees against abusive treatment,5 which also extend to the complainant and are, at the present time, regularly monitored by the State party’s authorities in situ. It is also relevant to the Committee’s consideration of the case that Egypt, a State party to the Convention, is directly bound properly to treat prisoners within its jurisdiction, and any failure to do so would be a breach of the Convention. In the light of the above circumstances, the Committee considers that there is not, at this time, a substantial personal risk of torture of the complainant in the event of her return to Egypt. 13. The Committee against Torture, acting under article 22, paragraph 7, of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, considers that the complainant has not substantiated her claim that she would be subjected to torture upon return to Egypt, and therefore concludes that the complainant’s removal to that country at the present time would not constitute a breach by the State party of article 3 of the Convention. [Adopted in English, French, Russian and Spanish, the English text being the original version. Subsequently to be issued also in Arabic and Chinese as part of the Committee’s annual report to the General Assembly.] 4 5 See, for example, M V v The Netherlands Case No 201/2002, Decision adopted on 30 May 2003. The Committee against Torture has viewed and considered the provisions of the guarantees provided.