claiming compensation where no individual perpetrator is identified. Additional obstacles include the lack of resources for implementation, immunity and amnesty laws, overly restrictive statutes of limitations, corruption, and weak institutions. The ACHPR has observed that victims can struggle to obtain redress because of the lack of effective policies, programmes, administrative measures and institutional arrangements designed to end human rights violations, but also because of the existence of laws allowing such acts.394 This has prevented families of the victims of ED from pursuing legal proceedings before domestic courts in both countries. In all countries studied, institutions lack independence and/or rule of law, or suffer from a severe lack of resources. For instance, in Libya, institutions have broken down due to conflict and, as a result, the criminal justice system is ineffective and not operational.399 Finally, in all of the countries studied, there is a clear lack of political willingness to pursue cases of ED. In Sudan and Zimbabwe, there is currently no legislation that outlaws ED specifically, leaving victims with no direct avenues to seek justice and reparation.395 Whilst Libyan legislation specifically prohibits ED and torture, the definition of ED is not in line with that recognized under International Law. This hinders access of victims to reparations. Given the lack of adequate legal and policy frameworks to provide redress to victims of ED in Africa, it is recommended that the ACHPR issues specific guidelines that assist African States in ensuring the right of victims of ED to reparation. Such measures could include the setting up of formal registers and databases to keep a record of the victims of ED with disaggregated data (by age, gender, etc.), including genetic information that assists in the search of the victims; best practices on forensic, technical and scientific means to search for the disappeared; training of law enforcement on the prevention and investigation of ED, and other measures. In Algeria, Ordinance No. 06-01 grants blanket immunity from prosecution to security forces and statearmed militia.396 Moreover, relatives willing to pursue litigation and advocacy risk prosecution under article 46 of the Ordinance.397 Similarly, in Sudan, officials largely benefit from legally enshrined immunities.398 394 ACHPR, General Comment No. 4 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Right to Redress for Victims of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment or Treatment (Article 5), 2017, para. 14. 395 LFJL, Unforgotten: Enforced Disappearance in Libya, supra note 92, p. 12; ACJPS, Enforced Disappearance in Africa: Baseline Study for Sudan, September 2020, p. 26; ZLHR, Enforced Disappearances - An Information Guide for Human Rights Defenders and CSOs, January 2016, p. 24. 396 MENA Rights Group, Waiting for Redress: The Plight of Victims of Enforced Disappearances in Algeria (Baseline Study), August 2020, p. 25; Algeria, Ordinance no. 06-01, 27 February 2006, Article 45. 397 Republic of Algeria, Law No. 06-01 on the Prevention of and Fight against corruption, 27 February 2006, Article 46, “the wounds of the National Tragedy to harm institutions of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, to weaken the state, or to undermine the good reputation of its agents who honourably served it, or to tarnish the image of Algeria internationally, shall be punished by three to five years in prison and a fine of 250,000 to 500,000 DA.” 398 ACJPS, Enforced Disappearance in Africa: Baseline Study for Sudan, September 2020, p. 4. 399 LFJL, Unforgotten: Enforced Disappearance in Libya, supra note 92, p. 10. 56