E/CN.4/2004/56/Add.3 page 12 São Paulo and Pará, the Public Prosecutor’s Office includes prosecutors specialized in human rights. However, the Special Rapporteur has been informed that this has not resulted in more efficient prevention or punishment of cases of torture. 57. Recommendation (m) stated: Investigations of police criminality should not be under the authority of the police themselves, but in principle, under the authority of an independent body with its own investigative resources and personnel. As a minimum, the Office of the Public Prosecutor should have the authority to control and direct the investigation. They should also have unrestricted access to police stations. 58. According to the information received, the police ouvidorias (ombudsmen) have greater autonomy and independence in carrying out investigations of crimes committed by police officers, in particular compared to the corregedoria (internal affairs department). However, it is reported that the ouvidorias often do not have enough financial resources to proceed with investigations. 59. The Special Rapporteur has also been informed that although investigations have to be conducted by the police, members of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, prosecutors and attorneys-general are also allowed to carry out investigations, in particular with respect to crimes committed by police officers involving gross violations such as torture, or corruption cases involving wealthy or politically important people. However, the Special Rapporteur has also been informed that the Federal Supreme Court has recently stated that members of the Public Prosecutor’s Office cannot carry out criminal investigations directly, but have to delegate them to the judicial police. Moreover, a proposed law to exclude attorneys-general and prosecutors from criminal investigations was reportedly approved by the Chamber of Deputies on 25 June 2003. 60. Recommendation (n) stated: Positive consideration at the federal and state levels should be given to the proposal to create the function of investigating judge, whose task would be to safeguard the rights of persons deprived of liberty. 61. According to the information received, there is no official debate on the creation of the function of investigating judge. 62. Recommendation (o) stated: If for no other reason than to bring an end to chronic overcrowding in places of detention (a problem that building more detention places is unlikely to be able to solve), a programme of awareness-raising within the judiciary is imperative to ensure that this profession, at the heart of the rule of law and the guarantee of human rights, becomes as sensitive to the need to protect the rights of suspects, and indeed of convicted prisoners, as it evidently is to repress criminality. In particular, the judiciary should take some responsibility for the conditions and treatment which befall those they order to remain in pre-trial detention or sentence to terms of imprisonment. When dealing with ordinary criminality, they should also be reluctant, when alternative charges are available, to proceed with charges that prevent the grant of bail, rule out alternative sentences, require closed-regime custody, and limit progression of sentences.