CCPR/C/119/D/2613/2015 recognize an absolute and non-derogable prohibition of torture upon return and refers to the provisions of related international and regional human rights treaties and to international and regional human rights jurisprudence.26 3.11 The author submits that the motion to stay his removal order was denied on 28 May 2015 because of an obvious error in the application of the law, against which no domestic remedies remain available. He therefore claims that his removal from Canada would deprive him of his right to an effective judicial remedy, in violation of article 2 (3), read in conjunction with articles 6, 7, 9, 17 and 23, of the Covenant. State party’s observations 4.1 On 27 November 2015, the State party submitted its observations on the admissibility and merits of the communication. The State party argues that the author’s communication is inadmissible for non-exhaustion of effective and available domestic remedies and for non-substantiation. Concerning the author’s allegations under article 9 of the Covenant, the State party submits that they are incompatible ratione materiae. 4.2 The State party submits that the author has not exhausted all available domestic remedies and that his communication is therefore inadmissible. In that regard, the State party submits that the author failed to apply for an administrative deferral of removal from the Canada Border Services Agency, which is another avenue with a reasonable prospect of redress for the author. Individuals who raise new evidence of personal risk, meaning evidence that has not previously been assessed by a competent risk decision maker, such as a pre-removal risk assessment officer, may request a deferral of removal from an Agency enforcement officer. The Federal Court of Appeal has held that an enforcement officer must defer removal if there is compelling evidence that the removal could expose the person to “a risk of death, extreme sanction or inhuman treatment”.27 The State party further indicates that, if the decision on removal had been negative, the author could have sought judicial review of that decision. 4.3 Concerning the author’s allegation that his removal to El Salvador would violate article 9 of the Covenant, the State party submits that, assuming that the author’s allegations relate to a risk of arbitrary detention in El Salvador, this allegation is inadmissible because it is incompatible with the scope of State party’s obligations under article 9 (1) of the Covenant. In that connection, it argues that article 9 (1) does not impose an obligation on States parties to refrain from removing individuals who face a real risk of arbitrary detention in the receiving State. It states that general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant limits a State party’s exceptional obligations to foreign nationals who are subject to removal to situations “where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant”. 4.4 The State party submits that the author’s allegations concerning article 2 (3) are not sufficiently substantiated and should be held inadmissible. It further indicates that the author has not clearly stated what violations of article 2 (3) have taken place, either on its own or in conjunction with the other articles. It submits that the author’s arguments concerning the 2015 pre-removal risk assessment decision and Federal Court stay decision are manifestly unfounded and that he has not provided any evidence to substantiate that those remedial avenues were arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. It claims that both the assessment officer and the Federal Court carefully considered the author’s claims and the evidence provided, and that the Committee is not competent to re-assess those domestic decisions. 4.5 The State party also submits that the author has not sufficiently substantiated his allegations with respect to articles 17 and 23 (1) of the Covenant for purposes of admissibility. He has not explained how his removal to El Salvador would constitute an arbitrary or unlawful interference with his family life. In that connection, the State party 26 27 6 See, for example, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 3. See, for example, Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Shpati, 2011 FCA 286, paras. 41-45 and 52.