CCPR/C/116/D/2399/2014 Procedure — enacted through Decree No. 050 of 1987, Decree No. 2700 of 30 November 1991 and Act No. 600 of 2000 — also prohibited persons from filing as civil parties to the prosecution during the preliminary stage of criminal proceedings. This restriction was abolished by the Constitutional Court in April 2002. Therefore, under the procedural legislation that was in force until 2002, the authors were unable to file as civil parties to the prosecution in the preliminary stage of the criminal proceedings, which would have allowed them to challenge the actions of the military criminal court on the basis of a conflict of jurisdiction. Moreover, the authors were not empowered to file as civil parties to the prosecution in the proceedings of the military court because the Military Criminal Code of 1958, which was in force at that time, allowed victims or their legal beneficiaries to file as civil parties to the prosecution only in cases concerning ordinary offences and prohibited such proceedings with respect to strictly military offences. Also, the case law of the Higher Military Tribunal and other bodies in the military criminal court system excluded the possibility of filing as civil parties to the prosecution with respect to ordinary crimes committed in the performance of duties. In any case, the military criminal courts cannot be considered an effective remedy. Lastly, the authors submit that, because they were residing abroad for security reasons, they were unable to bring reparation claims against the State before the system of administrative justice, since the Administrative Code stipulated a twoyear statute of limitations, counting from the date when the events occurred, on claims for direct reparation. 3.9 The authors contend that, in practice, they were unable to submit their communication to the Committee any earlier for security reasons. They claim that the Optional Protocol does not establish a deadline for submitting a communication and that the mere passage of time between the date when the events occurred and the date when the communication was submitted does not in itself constitute an obstacle that would prevent the Committee from deciding on the merits of a case under its consideration. 4 In the case at hand, there are exceptional circumstances that make this a sui generis case, in the light of the position of A.F.D. as a member and leader of M-19, which the military forces viewed as an enemy armed group that must be eliminated. The authors add that, during the years following the death of A.F.D., M-19 members were killed and disappeared and their families lived in terror, and many people were forced into exile. They point out that throughout the 1990s there were massive human rights violations and widespread impunity, 5 as well as persecution of officials who investigated serious human rights violations committed against members or former members of M-19. Similarly, lawyers who represented victims of human rights violations were persecuted and, in some cases, murdered, as was the case with their legal counsel, J.E.U.M. Given this situation, C.L.C.D. had a well-founded and legitimate fear that any claims she might bring before international bodies against the State party could expose her to serious danger and put her life and personal safety and that of her two daughters at risk. During the period from 1989 to 2003, when she and her children resided in the State party, naturally their priority was to ensure 4 5 6 The authors refer to the Committee’s jurisprudence in relation to communication No. 1618/2007, Frantisek Brychta v. Czech Republic, decision adopted on 27 October 2009, para. 6.3; communication No. 1623/2007, Guerra de la Espriella v. Colombia, Views of 18 March 2010, para 8.3; and communication No. 1479/2006, Persan v. Czech Republic, Views of 24 March 2009, para. 6.3. The authors refer to the Human Rights Committee’s concluding observations concerning the fourth periodic report of Colombia (CCPR/C/79/Add.76), paras. 15 and 18; the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (E/CN.4/1998/16), para. 172; the report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers on his mission to Colombia (E/CN.4/1998/39/Add.2), paras. 26 and 27; the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Office in Colombia (E/CN.4/1999/8), para. 150; and the third report on the human rights situation in Colombia of the Organization of American States (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Doc. 9 rev. 1). GE.16-11906