that one or more such offences may be committed”). This last objective requirement separates incitement to terrorism from an act of glorification of terrorism. The requirement of intention in article 5 (2) reaffirms the subjective element within the definition of public provocation to commit a terrorist offence and requires the act of communication also to be intentional. A troubling trend has been the proscription of the glorification (apologie) of terrorism, involving statements which may not go so far as to incite or promote the commission of terrorist acts, but might nevertheless applaud past acts. While such statements might offend the sensibilities of individual persons and society, particularly the victims of terrorist acts, it is important that vague terms of an uncertain scope such as glorifying or promoting terrorism are not used when restricting expression. A joint declaration of experts on freedom of expression explains that “incitement should be understood as a direct call to engage in terrorism, with the intention that this should promote terrorism, and in a context in which the call is directly causally responsible for increasing the actual likelihood of a terrorist act occurring.” 92 I.  Freedom of association The right to freedom of association, like the right to freedom of expression, is a platform for the exercise and defence of other rights, such as political participation rights and cultural rights. Human rights defenders often use this right as a legal basis for their action. It is central to a democratic society.93 However, it is often limited by States in their response to a real or perceived terrorist threat.94 While the right to freedom of association may be subject to derogations and limitations under most human rights treaties, clear safeguards must exist to ensure that they are not used to curb the rights of political opposition parties, trade unions or human rights defenders.95 As such, the onus must be on the State to show that the measures taken fall within the permissible aims under international human rights law. This implies that States must not claim that the rights-limiting measures are taken to preserve national security when they are in fact taken to effectively stifle all opposition or to repress its population. In addition to ensuring that the principles of necessity and proportionality are respected in all cases, specific safeguards are required to ensure that the limitations to the right to freedom of association are construed narrowly.96 These include ensuring that the principle of legality is respected 43