81. Recently, the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture has stated that it “considers that an evidence-led and not confession-led approach to criminal investigation to be one of the fundamental safeguards, as it would render having recourse to extracting confessions by means of ill-treatment meaningless and thus reduce considerably the risk of ill-treatment of persons in police custody.”129 82. In the case of Mexico, the subscription of judges at all levels to the doctrine of “procedural immediacy”, as interpreted in the current case - that spontaneous confessions under pressure are more reliable than exculpatory statements made after pause for reflection - may drive confessions in police custody to be given more weight in criminal proceedings. 83. The doctrine of procedural immediacy relies in part for its legitimacy on a notion that subsequent “ratifications” of incriminating statements void any concerns about the way in which they were initially obtained, because the defendant has a chance to speak in front of the judge with all the protections that entails. However, it is unrealistic to expect that someone who has been tortured to confess to a crime will not also be threatened with further mistreatment should he/she speak about the torture before the prosecutor and/or judge.130 Therefore, the presumption of voluntariness applied to such statements is misplaced. 84. More specifically, there is substantial evidence that the protections in Mexico’s national legislation and Constitution have been undermined by the Supreme Court’s insistence that, when there are two conflicting statements from a suspect, the earlier in time is to be preferred.131 Unsurprisingly, this earlier statement is usually made in police custody, at the early stages of detention. It is well known that the first moments after apprehension or arrest are those where the risk of torture or other forms of ill-treatment is greatest.132 In addition, the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the requirement that the statement be “established” or “verified” to have been made as a result of torture, placing a burden on the defendant which is very difficult to meet, and has allowed confessions alone to form bases for conviction.133 85. In this connection, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights in Manríquez v Mexico has stated: “the principal of procedural immediacy as conceived by the Mexican State, instead of serving as a procedural guarantee for persons accused of crimes, is 134 becoming its antithesis, a source of abuses of the accused.” 86. In cases involving ‘confirmation’ of confessions, such as the present case, national courts generally reject the Mexican approach. In an Article gathering relevant jurisprudence for a recent Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law, Professor Stephen Thaman of St Louis University wrote: “Regarding fruits of involuntary confessions, the US [Supreme Court] has intimated in Oregon v Elstad, that a confession which otherwise comports with 129 Subcommittee on prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Report of the visit to the Maldives, UN doc. CAT/OP/MDV/1 (26 February 2009). 130 Support for this view may be found in e.g. the report of the Committee against Torture, inquiry visit to Mexico under article 20 of the UNCAT, UN doc. CAT/C/75, at §§199-200 (2003). See also J. Maull, The Exclusion of Coerced Confessions and the Regulation of Custodial Interrogation under the American Convention on Human Rights, American Criminal Law Review Vol 32, 87. 131 See e.g. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Mexico, UN doc. CCPR/C/MEX/CO/5, at § 14. 132 See e.g. European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, 6th General Report [CPT/Inf(96)21], at §15. 133 See Maull, note 130, at 121. 134 As above at § 82. 19