“alternatively” and “when necessary”, which are inconsistent with the binding nature of the obligation to afford reparation when an international legal obligation is breached. When Article 3 is breached, there is an obligation to afford reparation, in cases where refoulement has resulted in torture or other ill-treatment, as well as instances where ill-treatment has not actually materialized.72 This Committee has observed that the right to an effective remedy underpins the entire Convention “for otherwise the protections afforded by the Convention would be rendered largely illusory.”73 It has thus held that “in order to reinforce the protection of the norm in question and understanding the Convention consistently, the prohibition on refoulement contained in article 3 should be interpreted the same way to encompass a remedy for its breach, even though it may not contain on its face such a right to remedy for a breach thereof.”74 45. In its General Comment 3, this Committee articulated that the appropriate forms of reparation depend on the nature of the breach and the consequences for the victim. Reparation must be adequate, effective and comprehensive.75 A breach of Article 3 is sufficient to establish an obligation on the State party to afford reparation. The ultimate consequences for the victim are thus relevant not on whether reparation should follow, but on what forms of reparation would be most appropriate. 46. The ‘nature’ of the breach of Article 3 concerns the actions or inactions by the State party leading to the refoulement. The consequences for the victim after the breach are immaterial to the determination of the ‘nature’ of the breach, given that Article 3 is preventative; there is no need for actual torture to have subsequently occurred for Article 3 to have been breached or for the risk to be re-confirmed postrefoulement. Thus, any breach of Article 3, regardless of the ultimate consequences for the victim, constitutes a breach of the State party’s international obligations and results in an obligation to afford reparation. The reference in paragraph 22 of the draft to “persons deported where they have subsequently faced a substantial risk of being tortured or they have been tortured in the receiving State…” therefore inappropriately narrows the categories of persons to whom reparation should apply, namely: - “persons deported” is a subset of the multitude of individuals who may be victims of a violation of Article 3. Any victim of a violation of Article 3 is entitled to reparation; “where they have subsequently faced a substantial risk of being tortured or they have been tortured in the receiving State” is a similar limitation on the categories of individuals who may be a victim of a violation of Article 3. The reference to “substantial risk” imposes a higher test than what is set out for a breach of Article 3. Furthermore, the reference to torture in the receiving State is immaterial to the breach of Article 3 and concomitant obligation to afford reparation. 47. The consequences for the victim of an Article 3 breach can vary considerably and include: 1) individuals who are at real risk of torture or other ill-treatment but have not yet suffered such abuse; 2) individuals who have been subjected to torture or other ill-treatment and continue to face a real risk; 3) individuals who have been subjected to torture or other ill-treatment but are no longer at risk (e.g. they may now be 72 See e.g., CAT, Tebourski v. France, UN Doc. CAT/C/38/D/300/2006, 11 May 2007, para. 10; CAT, Bachan Singh Sogi v. Canada, UN Doc. CAT/C/39/D/297/2006, 29 November 2007, para. 12. 73 See e.g., CAT, Agiza v Sweden, UN Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003, 24 May 2005, para. 13.6. 74 Ibid. 75 CAT, General Comment No. 3, UN Doc. CAT /C/GC/3, 19 November 2012, para. 6. 23 AI Index: IOR 40/6040/2017