respect a request for interim measures, the State party violates,118 breaches119 and/or seriously fails to comply120 with its obligations under article 22 of the Convention. However, by making a much weaker statement, namely that “[i]t would constitute a serious damage and obstacle to the effectiveness of the Committee’s deliberations and would shed a serious doubt on the willingness of the State party to implement Article 22 of the Convention in good faith”, the draft appears to depart from this case-law and to unwittingly underplay the gravity of non-compliance with an interim measure request and its serious implication. This shift is not consistent with the approach developed and consistently restated by the Committee in its decisions. 121 86. States parties that have authorized the Committee to consider individual complaints are obliged to refrain from interfering with the processing of such complaints. Non-compliance with interim measures hampers the processing of petitions as it nullifies the subject matter of a complaint and makes it impossible for an individual to obtain a remedy preventing the violation before the Committee. As stated by the Committee, by making the declaration under article 22, “States parties implicitly undertake to cooperate with the Committee in good faith by providing it with the means to examine the complaints submitted to it”.122 87. To bring the current draft into line with the Committee’s established case law on the legal consequences of non-compliance with interim measures, we recommend that the draft provide clearly that interim measures are legally binding on States parties that have made a declaration under Article 22. Recommended textual changes: 38. States parties that have made a declaration under Article 22 undertake to comply with interim measures issued by the Committee. When the Committee, or members designated by it, request the State party concerned, for its urgent consideration to take such interim measures that the Committee considers necessary to avoid irreparable damage to the alleged victim or victims of violation of Article 3 of the Convention, in accordance with Rule 114 of the Committee’s rules of procedure, the State party must should comply with the Committee’s request in good faith. 39. Non-compliance by the State party with the Committee’s request would make evident that the State party failed in fulfilling its obligations to cooperate with the Committee.30 It would constitute a serious damage and obstacle to the effectiveness of the Committee’s deliberations and would shed a serious doubt on the willingness of the State party to implement Article 22 of the Convention in good faith. The failure to respect a request for interim measures constitutes a breach of the State party’s obligations under article 22 of the Convention as it nullifies the effective exercise of the right to complain conferred by article 22, thus 118 CAT, Kalinichenko v. Morocco, UN Doc. CAT /C/ 47 /D/ 428 / 2010, 18 Jan. 2012; CAT, Boily v. Mexico, UN Doc. CAT /C/47/D/327/2007, 13 Jan. 2012; CAT, R.S. et al. v. Switzerland, UN Doc. CAT/C/53/D/482/2011, 19 Jan. 2015. 119 CAT, Tursunov v. Kazakhstan, UN Doc. CAT/C/54/D/538/2013, 3 July 2015; CAT, Singh v. Canada, UN Doc. CAT/C/46/D/319/2007, 8 July 2011. 120 CAT, P.S.B. and T.K. v. Canada, UN Doc. CAT/C/55/D/505/2012, 1 Oct. 2015; CAT, X. v. Kazakhstan, UN Doc. CAT/C/55/D/554/2013, 9 Oct. 2015; CAT, X. v. Russian Federation, UN Doc. CAT/C/54/D/542/2013, 30 June 2015; CAT, Abdussamatov et al. v. Kazakhstan, UN Doc. CAT/C/48/D/444/2010, 7 June 2012. 121 See e.g. CAT, P.S.B. and T.K. v. Canada, UN Doc. CAT/C/55/D/505/2012, 1 Oct. 2015, para. 9. 122 CAT, Tursunov v. Kazakhstan, UN Doc. CAT/C/54/D/538/2013, 3 July 2015, para 7.2. 36 AI Index: IOR 40/6040/2017