SECTION 1. Implemenation of the NMP in ukraine 11 matters within the mobile groups’ competence, in compliance of the requirements of the legislation of Ukraine with regard to protection of state secrets; – to hold meetings and interviews with the personnel of Internal Affairs bodies and units with regard to their social safeguards, work conditions and issues with police compliance with the constitutionally protected human and civic rights and freedoms; – to receive complaints from persons detained, apprehended and taken into custody, for further forwarding in accordance with the established procedure. In case of a complaint against unlawful actions of the personnel of remand prisons or other personnel of an Internal Affairs body the members of the mobile group relevantly notify the management of the city, district or line police body, for its further response.” Analysis of the mobile groups’ operation allows viewing them as a prototype of the NPM in Ukraine. The sphere and mechanisms of their activity largely conformed with the OPCAT requirements. The efficiency of their work was internationally recognized. Specifically, when commenting on Ukraine’s UNHRC report in May 2008 the representatives of 23 nations assessed the establishment and activities of mobile groups as a major accomplishment. CoE Commissioner for Human Rights T. Hammarberg also highly appraised this joint initiative of the Ukrainian police and civil society. Yet in spite of their efficiency the mobile groups failed to meet all key OPCAT criteria of NPM independence, since they: – operated under the Ministry of Internal Affairs order and not a law, and – did not enjoy full organizational and financial independence from territorial police departments obligated to ensure mobile groups’ activity. As a result of these constraints the efficiency of mobile groups’ operation fully depended on the “good will” of the MIA leadership and territorial police chiefs. After the 2010 appointment of the new Minister of Internal Affairs whose position as to cooperation with the civil society considerably differed from that of his predecessor the operation of mobile groups and Civil Councils became fully blocked. However, the efficient performance of mobile groups from 2006 through 2010 enabled accumulation of vast experience in visiting MIA custodial settings – the experience that was later used to monitor other closed institutions. For example, as of 2010 KhISR experts began visiting custodial settings under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Family, Youth and Sports, and as of 2011 – those under the Ministry of Social