OSCE/ODIHR Opinion on the Draft Amendments to the Act on Establishment of the Slovak National Centre for Human Rights proposals on human rights issues of concern. It recommends that the enabling law “establish a process whereby its reports are required to be widely circulated, discussed and considered by the legislature”. In particular, “[i]t is preferable for the NHRI to have an explicit power to table reports directly in the legislature rather than through the executive and, in so doing, to promote action on them.”39 The SCA has emphasised the importance of parliamentary consideration in its examination of NHRI practice and40 recommended that NHRIs have the explicit power to table reports to the legislature. 41 Therefore, § 1 (9) of the Draft Amendments should be amended to clarify that the Centre submits its annual report to the parliament, which should then have an obligation to consider and debate the report. Additionally, the Draft Amendments should specify where within the parliament the report will be debated. As, pursuant to Article 1 (9) it reports “on the observance of human rights including the area of non-discrimination in the Slovak Republic for the previous year”, it would be preferable if it were discussed in parliamentary plenary session rather than only on committee-level. The Draft Amendments could also specify a deadline within which the debate should take place. 3.5 Exclusion of the Intelligence Services from the Mandate of the SNCHR 35. §1 (12) of the Draft Amendments, explicitly excludes the intelligence services from the mandate of the Centre. The December 2018 amended explanatory note clarifies that this “does not constitute a new legal state” but is a declaration of the current state of the law. The SCA has made it clear that “an NHRI’s mandate should authorize the full investigation of all alleged human rights violations, including those involving the military, police and security officers”.42 It considers that while in some cases a NHRI’s mandate may be restricted for national security reasons “it should not be unreasonably or arbitrarily applied and should only be exercised under due process”.43 36. Where exclusions are made, they should be clearly defined and limited in scope to that which is strictly necessary in a democratic society. The blanket exclusion of the intelligence services as set out in the draft law should be reconsidered. Certain narrowly defined exclusions concerning the Intelligence Services could be possible but have to be justified by objective and precise enough criteria and necessary in a 39 Op. cit. fn 9 SCA General Observation 1.11. For example, in its assessment of the NHRI of Finland in October 2014, the SCA recommended a change in procedure in the enabling law to ensure that the parliament had the opportunity to discuss the NHRI’s report, and further, called on the NHRI to provide a consolidated annual report text to the whole parliament and not just a parliamentary committee. The SCA found that “In accordance with Section 12 of the Parliamentary Ombudsman Act, the annual report of the Ombudsman is tabled in Parliament and is discussed in the presence of the Ombudsman. The report of the HRC is presented to the Constitutional Law Committee, to other Committees depending upon the content of the report, and to members of Parliament. However, it is neither tabled nor discussed in Parliament. The SCA is of the view that, as a result of this difference in procedure, Parliament is not provided with a complete account of the work of the FNHRI.” SCA Report, Finland, October 2014, p. 9. 41 SCA Report, Zambia, SCA November 2016, pp. 59-60. 42 SCA Report, Northern Ireland, May 2016, p. 48. 43 Op. cit. fn 9 SCA General Observation 2.6; In justifying this provision, it states: “According to section A.2 of the Paris Principles, an NHRI should possess, “as broad a mandate as possible”. To give full effect to this Principle, the SCA recommends that this provision be understood in the widest sense. The mandate of the NHRI should extend to protect the public from acts and omissions of public authorities, including officers and personnel of the military, police and special security forces. Where such public authorities, are excluded from the jurisdiction of the NHRI, this may serve to undermine the credibility of the Institution.” 40 12