CEDAW/C/51/D/25/2010 l’inceste and a detailed affidavit from the director of the FCJ Refugee Centre. Furthermore, the author claims that the PRRA simply used the arguments which were put forward by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) without conducting its own comprehensive review. According to the author, 98 to 99 per cent of PRRA appeals are currently rejected. She argues that, in support of her application for judicial review, which was rejected on 18 January 2010, she had submitted new conclusive evidence, such as letters from Televisa in Mexico and many pieces of medical and psychological evidence. The case law of the Federal Court of Canada regarding the lack of protection for women in Mexico attests to the risk she faced. 3.4 The author also invokes article 2 (d), which guarantees protection against any act or practice of discrimination by public authorities and institutions. She alleges that, by exposing her to a risk of, at the very least, being detained in inhumane conditions and, at worst, the likelihood of being killed by her former spouse or his friends from the judicial police, the State party has not complied with its obligation to ensure her protection. 3.5 Article 3, which guarantees the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, was also allegedly violated, since the decision to deport her to Mexico exposed her to torture carried out with impunity. 3.6 The author considers that the State party has violated article 15 and her right to equality before the law, because her situation as a vulnerable woman was not a factor in the decision taken by the Canadian authorities. 3.7 Lastly, the author claims a violation of article 16 although she does not put forward any argument in support of this claim. State party’s observations on admissibility 4.1 In its observations of 6 December 2010, the State party challenged the admissibility of the communication under article 4, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Optional Protocol. 4.2 Firstly, the State party argues that the communication is inadmissible because it is now moot, given that the author has returned to Mexico of her own accord. The primary remedy for which the communication was submitted, namely the request that Canada should not deport the author, is now moot. Secondly, the State party argues that domestic remedies have not been exhausted, as the author has not applied for visa exemption and permanent resident status in Canada on humanitarian grounds. Thirdly, the State party submits that the right claimed by the author — namely the right not to be deported to a country where there are grounds for believing that the person would face a real risk of a violation of the right to life, torture, or a violation of the right to protection against any cruel or unusual punishment — is not provided for in the Convention. The State party considers that the Convention should not be interpreted as granting this right. 4.3 Fourthly, the State party maintains that the author’s allegations concerning the risk of gender-based violence that she would face if she were returned to Mexico were thoroughly examined by the Canadian authorities, who concluded that the author’s allegations were unfounded and that there is no evidence in the communication before the Committee to change that conclusion. Lastly, the State party considers that the communication is not sufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility, given that the author has not demonstrated that the Canadian system for processing applications for refugee status and the remedies before the Canadian courts are pointless and ineffective. 4.4 The author has explained to the Canadian authorities her reasons for leaving Mexico with her son on 17 November 2006. In the personal information form submitted to the Immigration and Refugee Board on 12 December 2006, the author claimed that since 1998 her spouse had become increasingly aggressive. On 15 January 2000 he allegedly hit her, 4 GE.12-41804