The complaint Author’s comments 3.1 The author maintained that her forced return to Peru would place her in danger of being subjected to torture. Such a situation had to be borne in mind, particularly in the context of the existence in Peru of a consistent pattern of violations of human rights, an aspect of which was the frequent use of torture against persons accused of belonging to insurgent organizations, as noted by United Nations bodies, the Organization of American States and nongovernmental organizations. The author therefore asked the Committee to request the State party to refrain from carrying out her forced return to Peru while her communication was being considered by the Committee. 5.1 In her comments on the observations by the State party, the author maintained that the extradition took place even though legal remedies had not been exhausted, at the time when the Supreme Court was considering an application for amparo with a request for precautionary measures against the decision granting extradition. The extradition took place on 3 July and only on 7 July 1998 did the Court rule on the application for amparo, declaring it inadmissible, together with the precautionary measure requested. In addition, the transfer to Peru took place by surprise, since the date was not communicated in advance either to the author or to her counsel. 3.2 She also maintained that, if she was extradited, proceedings would be brought against her that would not guarantee the fundamental principles of due process, since serious irregularities were committed every day in Peru during the trial of persons accused of belonging to an insurgent organization. Such irregularities were contrary to the provisions of the international human rights instruments ratified by Peru and by the State party. 5.2 The Supreme Court decision did not refer at all to the content of the reports submitted by the defence, but did refer at length to the opinion in favour of extradition issued by the Attorney-General of the Republic. The decision also did not refer to the provisional measures requested by the Committee, even though they were invoked by the defence. Only the dissenting judge referred to those measures, also noting that there were no grounds for convicting the author of the charges against her, that conditions in Peru did not guarantee due process and that international organizations had stated their views on flagrant human rights violations in Peru. As an argument against the opinion of the Supreme Court, the author also referred to the political nature of the offences with which she was charged in Peru. State party’s observations 4.1 Through its Special Rapporteur on New Communications, the Committee transmitted the communication to the State party on 11 May 1998, requesting it to submit its observations on the admissibility and, if it did not object thereto, on the merits of the communication. It also requested the State party to refrain from expelling or extraditing the author while her communication was being considered by the Committee. 5.3 The author said that neither she nor her counsel had received any reply in respect of the application for asylum, contrary to what the Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated when questioned by the Chamber of Deputies’ Standing Committee on Domestic Policy. According to what he said, the Minister had informed the author, in a letter dated 27 March 1998, that the application for asylum did not contain evidence of political persecution and that the final decision lay with the Supreme Court. 4.2 On 2 July 1998, the State party informed the Committee that the Supreme Court’s decision had been adopted in accordance with domestic legislation, particularly the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the 1928 Convention on Private International Law, to which Peru and Venezuela were parties. The activities attributed to the author, namely, involvement in manufacturing and planting car bombs for later attacks which killed and wounded a large number of people, constituted a serious ordinary offence, not a political offence. The State party also indicated that the defence had not provided any factual evidence to indicate whether or not article 3, paragraph 1, of the Convention against Torture was applicable. The statements by witnesses who accused the author and whom the defence claimed had been subjected to torture had been made without any coercion, as shown by the fact that they had been given in the presence of representatives of the Public Prosecutor’s Department and the defence lawyers. 5.4 He said that the State party had ratified the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, which provided that States had an obligation to set up the necessary machinery for their implementation. There were, however, no procedures or authorities in the State party to guarantee that asylum-seekers would be guaranteed that right. Moreover, the Executive authorities of the State party had said that they could take a decision on asylum only after the Supreme Court had ruled on extradition. That argument was wrong, however, because asylum and extradition are two different and autonomous legal institutions. 5.5 The author reported to the Committee that, following her extradition, she was sentenced in Peru 63