Complainant’s comments the Federal Court on the standard of “reasonableness simpliciter”, which means that the ‘discretion’ is far from absolute. 5.1 On 12 February 2006 counsel commented on the State party’s observations. She notes that the complainant submitted his humanitarian and compassionate application on 17 January 2006. Further, on 27 January 2006 the Federal Court granted the judicial review and remitted the PRRA application to be determined by a new officer. New PRRA submissions were due on 17 March 2006. 4.5 The State party challenges the Committee’s reasoning in Falcon Ríos to the effect “that the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies requires the petitioner to use remedies that are directly related to the risk of torture in the country to which he would be sent, not those that might allow him to stay where he is.”13 The State party argues that article 3 of the Convention obliges States not to expel, return or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. If an individual is permitted to stay in Canada, it follows that he will not be returned to the country where he alleges to be at risk. It should not matter on what grounds a person is not removed.14 The State party invokes the Committee’s decision in A.R. v. Sweden 15 where it was determined that an application for a residence permit, which could be based on humanitarian grounds but which could be decided on the grounds of a risk of torture was a remedy required to be exhausted for the purposes of admissibility. The State party argues that since a humanitarian and compassionate application may also be based and approved on the ground of risk the person may face in the country to which he would be returned, it meets the requirements set out by the Committee. 5.2 The complainant argues that the PRRA is not an effective remedy for purposes of admissibility.16 Although PRRA officers may be considered to be specially trained, they are not experts when it comes to official documents such as warrants or summons for arrests and do make erroneous findings in such regard. The fact that, in the present case, such an error occurred during the first PRRA is evidence that such findings are not an effective remedy for those facing arrest in countries such as Myanmar. The complainant further submits that although he is now subject to a new PRRA assessment, he cannot be sure that the new PRRA officer will not make the same erroneous finding in respect of the warrant and the risk. For this reason, counsel argues that the Committee should declare the communication admissible. In the alternative, should the Committee find that the communication is inadmissible, the Committee should suspend its decision until the new PRRA determination has been made. Issues and proceedings before the Committee 4.6 Secondly, since the complainant is not in immediate danger of removal, the communication is also inadmissible under article 22, paragraph 2, of the Convention and rule 107 (c) of the rules of procedure, as incompatible with article 3 of the Convention, and is manifestly unfounded under rule 107 (b) of the rules of procedure. 6.1 Before considering any of the allegations in a communication, the Committee against Torture must decide whether or not the communication is admissible under article 22 of the Convention. The Committee has ascertained that the same matter has not been and is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 4.7 On 10 February 2006 the State party informed the Committee that the author’s judicial review application was granted on 27 January 2006. Pending the completion of the new PRRA, the complainant will have the benefit of a statutory stay of removal, and is therefore not presently at risk of removal to Myanmar. Therefore, the communication is inadmissible on the basis of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. 6.2 In accordance with article 22, paragraph 5 (b), of the Convention, the Committee does not consider any communication unless it has ascertained that the individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies; this rule does not apply where it has been established that the application of the remedies has been unreasonably prolonged, or that it is unlikely, after a fair trial, to bring effective relief to the alleged victim. 6.3 The Committee takes note of the State party’s contention that the complaint should be declared inadmissible under article 22, paragraph 5 (b), of the Convention since domestic remedies have not been exhausted, and since the complainant was granted a stay of removal and is not currently at risk of being deported. The Committee notes that the 13 Communication N° 133/1999, Falcon Ríos v. Canada, Views adopted on 23 November 2004, para. 7.4. 14 The State party refers to T.I. v. United Kingdom (App. N° 43844/98, Reports of Judgements and Decisions, 2000III, paras. 458–459), where the European Court of Human Rights was concerned with whether there were “procedural safeguards of any kind” protecting the applicant from removal. 15 Communication N° 170/2000, A.R. v. Sweden, inadmissibility decision of 23 November 2001, para. 7.2. 16 Referring to communication 232/2003, M.M. v. Canada, admissibility decision of 7 November 2005. 10