expected the Turkish authorities’ knowledge of his participation in the highway blockade to establish sufficient grounds for recognition as a refugee. His participation in the blockade could easily be inferred from his conviction of joint coercion in road traffic, since the judicial records exchanged between German and Turkish authorities indicate the date of a criminal offence. In the absence of witnesses of his participation in the PKK training course, which was to be kept secret, he claims the benefit of doubt for himself. He refers to the Committee’s general comment No. 1, which provides that, for purposes of article 3 of the Convention, the risk of torture “does not have to meet the test of being highly probable”. 3.3Moreover, the complainant refers to the written testimony by a Mr. F.S., dated 6 July 2002, in which the witness declared that he had travelled to the Kurdish festival in the Netherlands in 1994 together with the complainant, who had publicly declared to participate in the PKK. 3.4The complainant explains the apparent contradiction between the PKK’s policy of secrecy and the public presentation of 25 guerrilla candidates in front of 60,000 to 80,000 people at the Halim-Dener-Festival with the campaign, initiated by Abdullah Öcalan in March 1994, of demonstrating the Organization’s presence and capacity to enforce its policies throughout Europe. His exemption from the duty to undergo military PKK training was only temporary, pending a final decision to be taken in May 1995. In any event, inconsistencies in the official PKK policy could not be raised against him. 3.5As regards the burden of proof within national proceedings, the complainant submits that, pursuant to section 86 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure, the administrative courts must investigate the facts of a case ex officio. He was therefore under no procedural obligation to prove his PKK membership. By stating that he took part in a PKK training course from September 1994 to January 1995, the complainant considers to have complied with his duty to cooperate with the courts. 3.6As to the Turkish authorities’ knowledge of his PKK membership, the complainant contends that there can be no doubt that the Turkish secret service observed the events taking place at the Halim-Dener-Festival in 1994. Moreover, he claims to have seen one of his training officers at the Maastricht camp, called “Yilmaz”, on Turkish television after his arrest by Turkish police. “Yilmaz” reportedly agreed to cooperate with Turkish authorities, thereby placing the participants of the training camp at risk of having their identities revealed. The complainant further claims that one of his neighbour villagers told him that another participant of the training camp, called “Cektar”, to whom he had close contact during the course, was captured by the Turkish army. It can be reasonably assumed, according to the complainant, that “Cektar” was handed over to the police for interrogation and tortured in order to extract information on PKK members from him. 3.7The complainant concludes that, upon return to Turkey, he would be seized by Turkish airport police, handed over to specific police authorities for interrogation, and gravely tortured by those authorities. From previous views of the Committee he infers that the Committee found instances of torture by Turkish police likely to happen when the authorities were informed about a suspect’s collaboration with the PKK. 3.8The complainant submits that even if he had committed a criminal offence under German law by adhering to the PKK, this could not absolve the State party from its obligations under article 3 of the Convention. 3.9The complainant claims to have exhausted all available domestic remedies. His complaint is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. The State party’s observations on the admissibility of the complaint 4.1On 11 November 2002, the State party submitted its observations on the admissibility of the complaint, asking the Committee to declare it inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, pursuant to article 22, paragraph 5, of the Convention. 4.2The State party argues that domestic remedies which need to be exhausted include the remedy of a constitutional complaint, as held by the European Court of Human Rights in several cases concerning Germany.a Although the complainant lodged a constitutional complaint on 22 July 2002, he failed to exhaust domestic remedies, since this complaint was not sufficiently substantiated to be accepted for adjudication. In particular, the complainant failed to state why the challenged decisions infringed his constitutionally protected rights. It follows from the ratio decidendi of the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, dated 30 August 2002, that he “solely object[ed] to the assessment of facts and evidence by the lower courts”. 4.3The State party submits that domestic remedies cannot be exhausted by means of an inadmissible complaint which patently fails to comply with the admissibility criteria under national procedural law.b In the present case, the State party does not see any circumstances which would justify an exemption from the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies, given that the constitutional complaint combined with the application for a provisional order, pending the final decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, provided the complainant with an effective remedy. Complainant’s comments on the State party’s observations on admissibility 5.1In his response dated 9 December 2002, the complainant challenges the State party’s interpretation of the Constitutional Court’s decision of 30 August 2002. He argues that the Court explicitly or implicitly ruled his constitutional complaint inadmissible, arguing that it did not distinguish between aspects of admissibility and merits. However, as the complaint satisfied the admissibility criteria of section 93 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act, indicating the basic rights claimed to be infringed as well as the manner in which the lower courts’ decisions violated these rights, it follows that the Federal Constitutional Court did not reject it as inadmissible “but with reference to the merits of the case”. 5.2The complainant submits that the constitutional complaint is not an additional appeal but constitutes an extraordinary remedy, allowing the Constitutional Court to determine whether basic rights have been infringed by the lower courts, when these fail to comply with their duty to ensure the enjoyment of such basic rights. However, the questions whether the requirement to exhaust all available