4.9The State party also invokes DIMA’s opinion, which noted that the Algerian authorities are aware that many citizens who travel to foreign countries make refugee applications to escape from the civil strife and adverse economic situation in Algeria. It is noted that a mere asylum application by an Algerian citizen in another country is not a reason for the Algerian authorities to attempt to persecute or torture that person. 4.10The State party notes that by letter of 25 January 2000, the complainant was advised that arrangements had been made for him to leave Australia on South African Airways flight SA281, departing Sydney for Johannesburg at 9.40 p.m. on 26 January 2000. He was accompanied by three escorts on the flight to South Africa. Further, the State party adds that the complainant’s current whereabouts are unknown to Australian authorities. Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility 5.1The Committee has noted the State party’s information that the return of the complainant was not suspended and that it had not received in time the Committee’s request for interim measures under rule 108, paragraph 1, of its rules of procedure. The complainant was returned to Johannesburg on 26 January 2000. He stayed in South Africa for some time, but his current whereabouts are unknown. 5.2Before considering any claims contained in a complaint, the Committee against Torture must decide whether or not it is admissible under article 22 of the Convention. In this respect the Committee has ascertained, as it is required to do under article 22, paragraph 5 (a), of the Convention, that the same matter has not been and is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. The Committee also notes that the State party has not contested that domestic remedies have been exhausted. The State party further submits that the complainant has not substantiated his case for purposes of admissibility. It refers to the Committee’s Views in G.R.B. v. Sweden,a in which the Committee held that “A State party’s obligation to refrain from forcibly returning a person to another State where there are substantial grounds to believe that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture is directly linked to the definition of torture as found in article 1 of the Convention”. The State party also notes that the Committee stated that the burden is on the author to present an arguable case. The State party explains that this means establishing a factual basis for the author’s position sufficient to require a response from the State party. It argues that the facts relating to the complainant are not such as to warrant any response from Australia, and reiterates that the Committee noted that the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. For the State party, there are no substantial grounds for believing that the complainant will be subjected to torture. 5.3Notwithstanding the State party’s observations, the Committee considers that the complainant has provided sufficient information on the danger the complainant claims to run in the event of his return to Algeria to warrant consideration of his complaint on the merits. As the Committee sees no further obstacles to admissibility, it declares the complaint admissible and proceeds to the consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 6.1The Committee must decide whether the forced return of the complainant to Algeria would violate the State party’s obligation, under article 3, paragraph 1, of the Convention, not to expel or return (refouler) an individual to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. In order to reach its conclusion the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, including the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. The aim, however, is to determine whether the individual concerned would personally risk torture in the country to which he or she would return. It follows that, in conformity with the Committee’s jurisprudence and despite the allegations of the complainant in regard to the situation in Algeria outlined in paragraph 3.4 above, the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining whether the particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights does not mean that a person cannot be considered to be in danger of being subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 6.2The Committee notes that the petitioner invokes protection under article 3 of the Convention on the ground that he is personally at danger of being arrested and tortured in connection with his and his relatives’ support for the FIS. His alleged connections with the FIS date back to 1992, when he was detained and interrogated for 45 minutes. It is not submitted that the complainant was tortured or prosecuted for his connections with the FIS before leaving for Saudi Arabia. The complainant has not satisfied the burden placed upon him to support his claim that there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture, and that Algeria is a country where a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights exist. 6.3In the present case, the Committee also notes that the political activities of the complainant’s brother-in-law took place about 10 years ago, and that they may not in themselves constitute a risk for the complainant himself to be subjected to torture, should he be returned to Algeria. It further observes that the complainant’s alleged fear for military recall is not relevant to the issue under consideration. 6.4The Committee recalls that, for the purposes of article 3 of the Convention, a foreseeable, real and personal risk must exist of being tortured in the country to which a person is returned or, as in this case, a third country where it is foreseeable that he subsequently may be expelled. On the basis of the above considerations, the Committee considers that the complainant has not presented sufficient evidence to convince it that he would face a personal risk of being subjected to torture in the event of his return to Algeria.