Advance unedited version of the Convention and fulfilling each of the requirements established under Rule 113 of the Committee’s rules of procedure. 32. A State party’s obligations under the Convention apply from the date of the entry into force of the Convention for that State party. However, the Committee will consider communications on alleged violations of the Convention which occurred before a State party’s recognition of the Committee’s competence under Article 22 of the Convention through the declaration provided for in that Article, if the effects of those alleged violations continued after the State party’s declaration, and if such effects may constitute in themselves a violation of the Convention.59 33. With reference to Article 22, paragraph 5 (a), of the Convention, which requires that the Committee shall not consider any individual communication under that article unless it has ascertained that the same matter has not been, and is not being, examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement, the Committee considers that “the same matter” should be understood as relating to the same parties, the same facts and the same substantive rights.60 34. According to Article 22, paragraph 5 (b), the complainant must have “exhausted all available domestic remedies”, provided for in law and in practice, which would be effective.61 “This shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged or is unlikely to bring effective relief to the person who is the victim of violation of the Convention.”62 In the context of Article 3 of the Convention, the Committee considers that exhaustion of domestic remedies means that the complainant has applied for remedies which are directly related to his/her risk of torture in the country to which he/she would be deported, not for remedies that might allow the complainant to remain in the sending State party for other reasons.63 35. The Committee further considers that an effective remedy in the implementation of the principle of “non-refoulement” should be a recourse able to preclude, in practice, the deportation of the complainant where there are substantial grounds for believing that he/she would personally be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported to another country. The recourse should be a legally based right and not an “ex gratia” concession given by the authorities concerned64 and should be accessible in practice without obstacles of any nature. 59 60 61 62 63 64 12 See e.g. communication No. 495/2012, N.Z. v. Kazakhstan, decision adopted on 28 November 2014, para. 12.3 See e.g. communications No. 247/2004, A.A. v. Azerbaijan, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 25 November 2005, para. 6.8; No. 479/2011, E.E. v. the Russian Federation, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 24 May 2013, para. 8.4; No. 577/2013, N.B. v. the Russian Federation, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 25 November 2015, para. 8.2; No. 642/2014, M.T. v. Sweden, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 7 August 2015, para. 8.3; and No. 643/2014, U. v. Sweden, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 23 November 2015, para. 6.4. See e.g. communications No. 512/2012, Y v. Canada, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 28 July 2015, para. 7.2.; and No. 712/2015, Olga Shestakova v. the Russian Federation, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 28 November 2017, para. 6.4. See e.g. communications No. 024/1995, A.E. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 2 May 1995, para. 4; No. 441/2010, Evloev v. Kazakhstan, decision adopted on 5 November 2013, para. 8.6; and No. 520/2012, W.G.D. v. Canada, decision adopted on 26 November 2014, para. 7.4. See e.g. W.G.D. v. Canada, para. 7.4, supra fn. 62. See e.g. W.G.D. v. Canada, para. 7.4, supra fn. 62; and communication No. 562/2013, J.K. v. Canada, decision adopted on 23 November 2015, para. 9.2.