CCPR/C/119/D/2512/2014 author’s argument that, being incapable of exercising her basic economic and social rights, she may de facto be compelled to return to the Islamic Republic of Iran. 9.3 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant,21 in which it refers to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by article 7 of the Covenant which prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The Committee has also indicated that the risk must be personal and that the threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists is high.22 The Committee also recalls its jurisprudence that considerable weight should be given to the assessment conducted by the State party, and that it is generally for the organs of the States parties to the Covenant to review and evaluate facts and evidence in order to determine whether such risk exists, 23 unless it is found that the evaluation was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. 24 9.4 The Committee notes that the author was granted subsidiary protection in Italy in 2008, with a residence permit that expired on 19 October 2012, and that she travelled to Denmark with her two then-minor children on 16 July 2012, and applied for asylum. The Committee also notes the author’s allegation that in Italy, she lived with her former husband and children in an apartment to which she had been referred after her initial stay in reception centres, but had difficulties paying the rent as the couple had no stable employment and received no social assistance. The author further submitted that she suffers from bipolar disorder, depression and cervical cancer, that her son, born in November 2011 (aged 5) suffers from a heart disease, and that she was compelled by her spouse to prostitute herself in order to be able to cater to the needs of the family. 9.5 The Committee observes that the Italian authorities acceded to the request by the Danish Immigration Service to accept the author and her children back in Italy, in accordance with the Dublin II Regulation, however due to the living conditions prevailing in Italy, the Danish Ministry of Justice decided on 13 May 2013 that the author’s asylum application should be processed in Denmark for humanitarian reasons, in particular in light of the young age of the author’s son, D.M. The author’s asylum request was rejected on 12 March 2014, and this decision was confirmed by the Refugee Appeals Board on 14 August 2014. 9.6 The Committee notes the various reports submitted by the author highlighting the lack of available places in the reception facilities in Italy for asylum seekers and returnees under the Dublin II Regulation. The Committee notes in particular the author’s submission that returnees, such as herself, who had already been granted a form of protection and benefited from the reception facilities when they were in Italy, are no longer entitled to accommodation in the government reception centres for asylum seekers. 25 9.7 The Committee notes the finding of the Refugee Appeals Board that Italy should be considered the “first country of asylum” in the present case, and the position of the State party that the first country of asylum is obliged to provide asylum seekers with basic living conditions, although it is not required that such persons have the same social and living standards as nationals of the country (see para. 4.5 above). The Committee also notes the reference made by the State party to a decision of the European Court of Human Rights according to which, despite the situation in Italy having shortcomings, it had not been 21 22 23 24 25 See para. 12. See communications No. 2007/2010, X v. Denmark, Views adopted on 26 March 2014, para. 9.2; No. 692/1996, A.R.J. v. Australia, Views adopted on 28 July 1997, para. 6.6; and No. 1833/2008, X v. Sweden, Views adopted on 1 November 2011, para. 5.18. See communication No. 1957/2010, Lin v. Australia, Views adopted on 21 March 2013, para. 9.3. See, inter alia, Lin v. Australia, and communication No. 541/1993, Simms v. Jamaica, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 3 April 1995, para. 6.2. See Asylum Information Database, “Country report: Italy”, January 2015, pp. 54 and 55, available from www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/report-download/aida_italy_thirdupdate_final_0.pdf. 9