SHARING INFORMATION WITH STATES THAT TORTURE to the requirements described in Draft Article 41. 30 Such a conclusion would appear consistent with the views of jurist Matt Pollard, who asserts that “after the fact acceptance and use of information also could forcefully be argued to constitute implicit recognition of the situation created by torture as lawful since it treats the information no differently than legally-obtained information.”31 Individual criminal liability Pursuant to UNCAT article 4, commission of torture by complicity may also lead to individual criminal responsibility. However, as noted above, complicity is a complex form of liability and one in which various standards apply. The standards for complicity in domestic and international criminal law (for one example, see article 25 Rome Statute) apply distinct standards from those applying to State responsibility. Unlike forms of State responsibility, where courts might establish liability based on the imputed knowledge that shared information would lead to torture, where complicit liability is sought against individuals, the standard of liability is rightly much stricter due to the penal nature of the judicial sanction. Any standards for domestic criminal liability must be understood in light of the applicable domestic law in force. In relation to the international criminal law standards for complicit liability of individuals, standards appear to have been revised in light of the successful appeal of Perišić at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in February 2013, following his earlier conviction for providing arms and logistical assistance to the Bosnian Serb army, 32 and the contrary finding in the Appeal of 30 31 32 For support, see the criticism of the English case, Rangzieb Ahmed & Anor v. R [2011] EWCA Crim 184 (2011) by Sarah Fulton. Fulton asserts that the Court erroneously held the UK to lower expectations than those imposed by international law and that “the passive receipt of information known or suspected to have been obtained from torture may amount to an internationally wrongful act.” In S. Fulton, ‘Cooperating with the enemy of mankind: Can States simply turn a blind eye to torture?’, IJHR, 16:5, 773–795, at 774. M. Pollard, ‘Rotten Fruit: State Solicitation, acceptance, and use of information obtained through torture by another state’, NQHR, Vol.23/3, 349–378 (2005), at 377. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Momčilo Perišić, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 28 February 2013, IT-04-81-A. 27