BEWARE THE GIFT OF POISON FRUIT Charles Taylor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 33 According to the Perišić Appeals Chamber judgement, aiding and abetting must be ‘specifically directed’ toward the commission of crimes. 34 Despite some criticism of the Chamber’s ruling (and hence uncertainty over how the rule would be applied in future), its reasoning was to require a culpable connection between the aider and abettor and the principal perpetrator of the crime. Whatever the wisdom of their analysis, the result is that it is questionable that executive actors would be individually criminally responsible for torture when committed by complicit acts (such as sharing questions later used in the torture of a detainee) unless a sufficient degree of culpability such as specific direction is also shown. In summary, the absolute prohibition against torture condemns both active participation and acts of complicity in torture. Yet liability for acts of complicity is complex, and various unsettled principles of law serve to limit the predicable scope of State responsibility and individual liability. In light of apparent inconsistencies in jurisprudence and practice, further examination of the applicable law would be welcome. See SCSL, Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Appeals Judgement, SCSL-03-01-A, 26 September 2013, at paras. 479–480. 34 Citing ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 15 July 1999, IT-94-1-A, para.229. 33 28